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BRIEF OF R.ESPONDEUT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case 1b. 17267 
'Ihis is a Declaratory Relief action, filed by Plaintiff-Appellant insurance 
compar;y, Government frrployees Insurance Canpany (GEIOO), seeking a determi.nation as 
to whether or not William Q-iarles Dennis was a resident of his father's household 
at the time of an accident, which occurred on February 25, 1978, and hence, an addi-
tional insured under the ten:is of a policy of liability insurance issued to his 
father. Respcndent, Holders, were seriously injured in said accident and hence, 
bcervened in this action. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\fil\ OOURT 
On May 27-28, 1980, a trial was held before the P.onorable Jay E. Banks. 
After the parties rested, the Court, in chambers, stated that only one reasonable 
inference could be drawn from the evidence and that was that William Charles Dennis 
was a resident of his father's household at the time of the accident and pursuant 
diereto, t:,.'-\e Court stared that it would grar,t Respondents, Holders ' lbtion For A Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Directed Verdict, but would give Appellant until the follming rmrning to come 
up with some n6'.7 case law. However, the next IIDrning, before Appellant's counsel 
presented any case law, the O:mrt advised counsel that it had decided to subrrit 
the case to the jury. The C.ourt instructed the jury as follows concerning the 
meaning of the term "resident of the same household" and the evidence necessary 
for the jury i::o detenrj_ne that William iliarles Lerinis was a "resident of the sar:E 
house.11olci" as the narred insured at the ti.De of the accident: 
"Instruction GO. 14. 
In determining whether Defendant, William Charles J:Binis, 
was or was not 'a resident of his father's household' as 
of the date of the accident, vou should use t.'le ordinarv 
mean:L.-ig of the word 'reside.-it'• . In other words' the word 
'resident' is to be understood in its plain, ordinary, a.-id 
comron sense usage. The test is what a reasonable person 
would understand it to rrean. 
A 'resident of the same household' within an autorrobile 
policy extE:"lding coverage on a non-owned autorrobile to &-iy 
relative who is a resident of the same housei1old as the 
named irsured, rreans one other than a tanporary or transient 
visitor, who lives together with others fa the same house 
for a period of sane duration, although he may not intend 
to remain t.'lere permanently. 
Synonyms of the word 'resident' are 'live, abide, sojourn, 
stay and lodge'. 
The intended duration must be determined after a thorough 
examination of all the relevant facts and cira.mstances sur-
rolll1ding the relationship. A persons intention at the time 
in question may be express or iq?lied, or both. 
All evidence introduced in this trial, together with the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, should be 
considered by you in answering d-1e question submi.tted to 
you in the Special Verdict." (Emphasis added). 
The above Instruction correctly stated the law with the exception of 
the second to last paragraph, which iI1correctly stated the law by rro.Y~ng "inten-
tion" an issue for the jury. Based on the testiIIDny of William Charles Dennis 
that his intentions were to eventually IllJVe out of his father's house ar.d return 
to Florida, although the subject had never been discussed, the jury found that 
William iliarles Dennis was not a resident of his facher 's household at the til'le 
of the accident, February 25, 1978, notwithstanding the \.ll1cor.troverted fact that 
William Charles Dennis had lived with his father for three ronths prior to c.'le 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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accident and haci even got a job during the last rronth prior to the accident and 
still continue<l to live with his father. Pursuant t.1-iereto, the Court entered 
Judgrxnt in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellant insurance canpany. 
Respondent, Holders, filed a H:ition For Judgm:nt I:otwithstanding ille 
Verdict, which correctly stated the law that in a case such as the one at bar, 
where a child is living with the nan:ed insured parent at t.1-ie ti...nie of t.1-ie accident 
and thus, not livi.1g apart in a separate household at the tillle of the accident, 
"intmtion" is not relevant or material to a determination of whether t.1-ie child is 
a resident of his parent's household at the t:i.r.'e of the accident. 1he Motion was 
heard Oi1 June 16, 1980, and the Court granted the Respondents' Motion For Judgrrent 
,:otwithstanding The Verdict on July 14, 1980, and entered Judgrrent in favor of the 
P-espondents to the effect that as a r.atter of law, the only reasonable infereoce 
to be dra1<m from t.1-ie uncontroverteci facts is that William Charles Dermis was a 
resident of his father's household at the tlire of the accident, February 25, 1978, 
and hence, covered as an additional insured under his father's policy of liability 
insurance. 
RELIEF SJUQIT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Holders , the injured parties in the accident of February 25, 
1978, seek to have t.1-ie Utah Suprerre Court affi= t.'-1e decision of the lower Court. 
In a very recent case, Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P2d 462 (Utah 11/19/79) 
in which Respondent, Holders' present counsel renresented the Defendant-Respondent, 
'.iignalls. the Utah Supreme Court reversed a jw:y verdict, finding a fa~ not to 
be :iegligent in a fa,._-m accident which severely injured Plaintiff, and held. as a 
matter of law, that only one reasonable inference could be drawn from the uncon-
~rovert2C! facts and that was that the fanrer was negligent. The opinion, written 
by Justice StEWart, stated the la1<1 as foll(ftls: 
"In detenrrining whether the trial Court properly denied 
Plaintiff's M:Jtion For Judgi:IEnt 1btwithstanding The V~r­
dict, Or For A c·:ew irial, ,;e are guided by the following Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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standards set out in McCloud v. Baum, Utah, 569 P.2d 1125, 
ll:D (1977) : 
' In reviewing the trial Court 's rulings pertaining to 
}btions For A Directed Verdict Or Judgment 1;.o.v., this 
Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable 
to d1e non-ITDving party and to afford him G'-te benefit of 
all inferences which the evidence fairly supports. If 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on 
the issue in controversy, a jury question exists and die 
M::ition should be denied. ' 
Also see Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 
P.2d 566 (1967)." 
After stat:L.1g that "there is no substantial dispute in t..'-te evidence", as in the ccc 
at bar, the Utah Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
"In Stavart v. Gil.rrore, 323 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1963), 
the Court stated: When the ends of justice require it, 
a . . . trial Judge has the prner and the duty to set 
aside a jury's verdict, to grant a new trial, or to grant 
a Judgment ::otwiths tanding The Verdict. The Appellate 
Court has a co=espondir.g responsibility.' See also 
Weeks v. Latter- Saints Hos ital, 418 F. 2d 1035 (10th 
Cir. 1 9 . Accordingly, our duty requires that we set 
aside the verdict and the Judgment of no cause of action 
and direct that Judgment l-Otwithstanding The Verdict 
be entered for Plaintiffs on the issue of liability." 
L'1 the case at bar, reviaving all "the evidence in the light rust favor-
able to the non-!ll)ving party", the Appellant insurance company, and affording it 
"the benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly supports", which is rele· 
vant and IPaterial to a determination of the issue at ha.rid, Respondent, Holders, 
respectfully submit i:hat, as a matter of law, there is only one reasonable ir.fer-
ence that can be drawn from the uncontroverted facts and G'-tat is that Williar: 
Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's household at the ti.Ire of the accidec: 
February 25, 1978. Based thereon, since "the trial Judge has ti1e pcwer and the 
duty to set aside the jury's verdict . . . " and "to grant Judgment Notwithstanding 
The Verdict", the trial Judge was correct in so doing in this case and because 
"the Appellate Court has a corresponding responsibility", the decision of the rr·_;. 
Court should be affinred by the litah Suprerre Court. 
U'l:JCO:'l'IBOVER.TED DISPOSI'.::'IVE FACTS 
The following facts are ur.controverted. GEICO does not dispute these 
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facts (See Appellant's Brief, p. 19). 
1. William Charles Dennis lived at his father's home from the latter 
oart of ~:Overrber, 1977, up to and including the day of the accident, February 25, 
1978, a period of about three rronths. (Tr. 465). (On Thanksgiving Day, he left 
Florida to return home, Tr. 453) . 
2. During the rront.'1 prior to and at the ti.Ire of the accident, he was work-
ing for the Bangerter irucking c.ompany of Centerville, Utah, rn3.king about $600 .00 
per oonth as a truck driver, but still living with his father. (Tr. 461 and 
Appellant's Brief, p. 19). 
3. At t.l-ie tirrE he applied for the job with the trucking corrpany, he used 
his father's address on t.J.ie application. (Tr. 466 and Appellant's Brief, p. 19). 
'+. At the t:i.rrE of t.'1e accident, William Qiarles Dennis gave his address 
on the police report as that of his father's. (Tr. 468 and Appellant's Brief, 
p. 19). 
5. About one rronth prior to the accident of February 25, 1978, in early 
January, 1978, William Charles Dennis was arrested, and he gave to the investiga-
ting officer, the address of his father, where he was living at the t:i.rrE, as his 
address. (Tr. 468). (ADpellant did not cite paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 in its Brief). 
6. .-\bout ~ oonths prior to the accident of February 25, 1978, William 
iliarles D=n.'1is IIDVed with his father, l!Dther, and sisters from one reside.'lce address 
(3062 South 1475 West in Ogden, Utah), to the reside.rice address he was living at 
with his faLl-ier, rrother, and sisters (2518 Pioneer PDad, Slaterville, Utah), on the 
ciay of the accident, .February 25, 1978. (Tr. 4G8 and 503). 
7. During the first three-to-four weeks (Tr. 460 and 508) he was living 
'.·.rith his father, he was sick, because of a!!phetamine addiction. During t.l-ie second 
rronth, he was home living wid1 his fad1er, he worked for Parkinson Dairy, as a dairy-
hand (Tr . .:+60 and 466). After t.'1e close of evidence, Appellant's case was reopened 
&'ld the parties' stipulated that Pilliam Charles Dennis would testify that he didn't 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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recall working for Parkinson Dairy duri;:ig this particular three rronth period of 
tirre before the accident. (Tr. 522). 
8. William Qiarles Denni.s brought with him from Florida, some persona~ 
items, a suitcase, an army foot locker, his car, his dog, and some gifts, induct· 
some vases, rnacranes, and a hand-made stool (Tr. 454, 459, and 503); he ate rmsc 
of his rreals at his father's residence, and he slept there. He had his own room 
at the house. (Tr. 467 and Appellant's Brief, p. 19). 
9. His parents provided him with TIOnetary assistance, including m::me;i 
for toilet articles and other needs and helped tune-up his car, while he was res;. 
ding with them. In addition, he did not pay any rent while he lived with his 
parents. (Tr. 467, 502, and Appellant's Brief, p. 19). 
10. During the three l!Dnths that he was living with his father, the 
question of Mr. Dennis' intentions as to how long he was going to be there and 
when, if ever, he was goL-ig back to Florida, never came up and the subject was 
never discussed. (Tr. 501 and AP1Jellant's Brief, p. 19). 
ll. During the b.l.ree rronth period of tirre prior to the accident, when 
William Charles Dennis was living with his father, he was not looking for another 
place to live, and he was not living at or maintaining or paying for ar,other or 
separate residence. (Tr. 468). 
12. William Charles Dennis' prior residence before coming to Utah in 
lbvenber, 1977, to live with his father, was an apartment in Florida where he had 
lived with a fenale roorrmate for one l!Dnth, but he could not even recall the 
address of the apartment or the roorrrmte' s DaCTe. (Tr. 450-451 and Appellant's 
Brief, p. 19). He paid one-half the rent for that rmnth, October, 1977, but he 
didn't pay any rent in Florida for tJoverrber or Decerrber of 1979, or January or 
February of 1978. (Tr. 452 and 477). During the three rnnths he resided wich hi5 
father in Utah, prior to the accident on February 25, 1978, William Chdrles DeM"-i 
made no attempt to locate the address of his prior residen::e, the aparnnent i.Jhere 
he had stayed in Florida where he had left many of his possessions. (Tr. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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STA1EMEi.u OF THE APPLICABLE I.AW ID 'Il!E Ui'TCONl.1\0VER.i.lill 
DISPOSITIVE FACTS 
In a recent 1979 Annotation at 93 ALR 3d 420-465, entitled ''\-ho Is 'Resi-
dent Or Hauber' Of Sam2 'Household' Or 'Family' As Named Insured, Within Liability 
Insurance Provision Definir1g Adcli.tional Insureds", the author, after reviewing all 
of the decided cases on this swject, concludes that v.ihere a child is living with 
his narred insured parent at the tirre in question, as in the case at bar, all of the 
ciecided cases have fou:-id that the child was a resident of his parents' household 
at the tirre in question. There is not one case to the contrary. Thus, in the case 
at bar, as a matter of law, \Jilliam Oiarles Dermis, "who had lived with his father 
for three m:mths prior to and including the day of the accident", was a resident 
of his father's household at the t:irr.e of the accident. 
In addition, the author concludes that the 'intentions" of the alleged insured 
"~an inportant consideration" only where the child, at the time in question, 
"is living apart from the named insured" in a separate household. If the child 
is not living apart in a separate household at the ti.me in question, the parties' 
"intentions" are not material or relevant. 1hus, in the case at bar, as a matter 
of law, since William Oiarles Dennis was not living apart in a separate household 
at the tirre of the accident, his "intentions" as to ooving from his father's 
residence and returning to Florida are not material or relevant and it was error 
for the trial Court to have made his "intentions" an issue for t.'ie jury to resolve. 
FL'l.3.lly, the author recognizes that the Courts have determined that the 
tenn "resident" is anbiv.ious and as a result, in cases where an alleged insured 
is att~ting to be included as a..-i insured tmder the policy, the term "resident" 
should be interpreted liberally in favor of coverage, and furu.'1er, that in exclu-
sion cases where the insurance canpany seeks to exclude an alleged insured from 
coverage if he is found to be a resident of the naIIEd irsured' s household, the 
tenn "resident" should be strictly or narrowly interpreted. Although the case 
at bar is an inclusion case, where a liberal interpretation should be applied to Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Lib ary. Funding for digitizatio  provided by the Institute of Museum and Libr ry Servic s 
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the term "resident", the Appella.'1t, GEICO, cites and relies on four living auart 
inclusion cases and three exclusion cases in an atte:npt to create a jury issue a; 
the alleged insured's intentions and to have the Court apply a strict or ciarm.1. 
terpretation to tJ1e tem "resident". Because the case at bar is a living with.Jr:· 
clusion case, where the alleged relative insured was living with the narr.ed insur0: 
at the ti.Ire of the accident, the living aDart inclusion cases and the exclusion co, 
where the alleged insured' s "intentions" l!'ay be relevant and P.'aterial and create 
a jury issue, are not releva.-it or applicable to the case at bar. 
OTHER FACTS WHICH ARE ~m RELEVANT OR MATERIAL 
The other facts which are cited by Appellapt insurance co~any in its Ed 
on pages lG-18, relate to the "intentions" of \villiam Charles Dennis and his fath: 
concerning how long William iliarles Dennis intended to stay with his father (Appe'.· 
lant's Brief, p. 17(2) and (3)) and the "intentions" of William iliarles Dennis 1·~-c 
respect to returning to Florida. (Appellant's Brief, page 18(11) and (12)). ::ot-
withstanding 1..hat the "intentions" of Willia.'ll Qiarles I:ennis and his father irav :~c 
been as to how long he planned to live with his father or as to his desire to retc: 
to Florida, subjects -wnich the Appellant admits never came up and were never dis-
cussed (Tr. 501 and Appellant's Brief, p. 19), in a case such as the one at bar, 
where a child is living 'ilith the named insured parent at the tire in question and 
thus, not living apart in a separate household at the time in question, the "intio·-
tions" of the child, William lliarles Lennis, and the named insured, his father, an 
not material or relevant and do not create an issue for the jury to resolve as to' 
determination of whether the child is a resident of his father's household 
Appellant insurance rornpany cites other i.mdisputed facts, which do not 
ronflict with the undisputed dispositive facts set forth abeve. HCMever, the 
facts cited by Appellant are too rermte or are not rmterial or relevant to a de-
tennii.-iation of whether William Qiarles Demiis was a resident of his father's house-
hold at the tirre of the accident, February 25, 1978. These facts relate to wnac Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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William 01arles Dennis was doing during the six years preceding his ret= to Utah 
to live with his father (Appellant's Brief, p. 16(1) and 17(4), (5), (6), (7), and 
(8)) a.'1d what possessions he left in Florida and what possessions he brought with 
him to Utah (Appellant's Brief, p. 17(9) and 18(10) and (12)), together with certain 
other facts involving his driver's license, his prior residence in Florida, his 
oi prior non-use of his father' S aUtOITDbile, and his father' S apPliCation to renew his 
insura.-ice policy. (Defendant's Brief, p. 18(14), (15), (16), and (17)). 
APill1EtIT 
TIIE LOWLR COURT CORRECTLY DETERMWED TIIAT, AS A MATTER OF IAW, 
111E ONLY RfASONABIE INFERENCE 'ID BE DRAllN FROM TilE UNCONIROVERTED 
FACIS WAS TilAT WII.LIAM CHARLES DEtWIS WAS A RESIDBIT OF HIS 
FA.Lr!ER'S HOUSIBOlD AT TilE TIME OF 'IHE ACCIDmr AND HENCE, All 
ADDITIONAL II-OIBED ULIDER HIS FA.Lr!ER' S POLICY OF LIABILI'IY m-
SURANCE 
On February 25, 197 8, William Cliarles Dennis was driving an autOimbile 
belongi...'1g to Sandra Freestone, who was a passenger in the front seat, when said 
autombile, which, at the time, was on the wrong side of the road, collided witi:t 
a IJDtor vehicle driven by Jarres Holder, in which his pregnant wife a.-id two children 
were riding as passengers. As a result of the collision, Sandra Freestone was 
killed and the Holders suffered severe and penranent injuries, for which they later 
obtained Jud~t on Augu;t 1, 1980, against William 01arles Dennis for $355,101.44. 
:;o appeal was filed on this Judgment. The policy of insurance issued to William 
Charles U:nnis' father by Appellant, GEICO, has policy limits of $50,000.00 per per-
son and $100,000.00 per accident. J:he parties, in the case at bar, stipulated, 
prior to the Declaratory Relief trial, dlat at the tiire of the accident, February 
~5, 1978, William Charles Dennis was driving a non-owned private passenger auto-
llXlbile wit.11 the permission of the owner of said autorrobile and as a result, the 
only question remaining for determination was whether or not William 01arles Dennis 
was a resident of his father's household at the tine of the accident, February 25, 
l978 In this regard, the pertine.-it part of the policy in question, states as fol-
' 
.. ':J..7S: 
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''Persons Insured: The following are insureds under 
Part I: 
''b . With 
(1) 
(2) 
respect to a non-0\'111.ed autorrobile, 
the named insured, 
any relative, but only with respect to a 
private passenger autorrobile or trailer . 
The tenn "relative" is defined by the oolicy as follows· 
"'?.elative' means a relative of the narred insured, 
wno is a resident of the sam: housEhold." 
Thus, the sole issue in this lawsuit was w'."1ether the definition of "re:: 
tive" applied to William Charles Dennis. In other words, was William Charles CE:. 
a resident of his father's household at the tiire of the accident, Februn.ry 25, ~"-
In the recent Annotation at 93 AI.B. 3d, 420-465, entitled 'i·Jho Is '1\esi:c: 
Or 'Menber' Of SaTIE 'House.Ji.old' Or 'Family' As l~amed Insured, Within Liabilitv b. 
ance Provision Definir,g Adciitional Insureds", d1e author states as folloc·1s. 
"Counsel seeking to prove that a particular individual 
was a 'residern::' of the sarre 'household' as the named 
insured rmy find it helpful to rrake the point, recognized 
by nurr.erous Courts, that such terms are arrbiguous and 
should, therefor@, be construed in accordance with 
general principles of insurance law, in such a manner 
as to favor policy coverage. 'fr,e point ltas also been 
!TE.de that since the tenilS are to be construed so as to 
favor coverage, the cases which have focused upon 
those term; in the context of policv clauses exclu-
ding liability coverage of an individual found to be 
a 'resident' of the narred insured's 'household' are 
of little value as precedents in apolying clauses 
extending coverage to those to 1vhom the tenilS apnly. 
Counsel for an alleged insured rey, therefore, find 
it helpful, where such :ases are cited as authority 
by opposing counsel, to err.phasize the tendencv of 
Courts, in attE!llDting to construe the relevant 
tenilS in such a manner as to favor coverage, to apply 
those tenilS narrcwly, as opposed to the !7l<:ffL.-ier in 
which the same tenns would be aPplied if occurring 
in inclusionary policy clauses." (Errphasis added) . 
The cases cited by .~pellant, GEICO, in its Brief, are not livi.--ig ivi~ 
clusion cases, as is the case at bar, but arc= either living apart inclusion case" 
exclusion cases, and hence, of "little value as precedents i;:i applv clauses 
coverage to whan the term resident applies". 
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It is vitally :important, therefore, at the outset to ascertain whether the 
cases being cited are living with inclusion cases, living apart inclusion cases, or 
exclusion cases. 1\n inclusion case is one where a person is attanpting to "include" 
hilr.self as a resident of t.1-ie narred insured's household and hence, an additional in-
sured under the oolicy, as in the case at bar; \lhereas, an exclusion case is one 
•,ihere the insurance canpany is atteIJ?ting to "exclude" from coverage a person who 
is a relative resident of the nar.ed insured's household, so that such a person can-
r.ot see the narred insured or other relative residents of his household. Appellant, 
GEICO, uses the same policy definition for the tenn "resident of the I1aI02d insured's 
iiousehold" for both situations, i.1clusion and exclusion. Naturally, insurers would 
orefer to have the tenn narrowly interpreted in inclusion cases and broadly inter-
preted in exclusion cases, as Appella..1t argues in the case at bar. Notwithstanding 
che insurance cor:ipany 's preference, since, the insurance coo;iany sdected the temri.n-
ol.ogy "resident of the na.-red insured' s household", which alrrost all Courts have 
said is arliiguous, the Courts have construed said term "in accord.&1ce with general 
crinciples of insura..1ce law, in such a rrmmer as to favor policy coverage" .1 
Consequently, in u.'-ie "inclusion" cases, the questioned te:rm is broadly 
interpreteci, while, in the "exclusion" cases, t.'le te:rm is given a TIJJCh nnre 
restricted interpretation. Such a dichotany is necessary, because in both situa-
tions, the Courts prefer the interpretation in favor of coverage. Indeed, one 
Court has stated: 
''The Courts have uniforml v held that where the clause 
is one of inclusion, it should be broadly construed for 
d1e benefit of the insured, ,Jhile in exclusion cases, 
the same clause is give..ri a nnre restricted interpre-
tation. This is necessary because ii.1 both situations 
1nie l'tah Suprerr:e Court has stated: 
"We recognize the validity of t.'-ie rule that if an 
i:-isurance policy is arrbiguous or uncertain, so that 
it is fairlv susceutible of differe.i.1t interpretations, 
any doubt should b~ resolved in favor of insurance 
coverage. '' American Casual tv G:imoanv Of Redding, Penn-
sv l vania v. Eagle Star Insurar.ce tciTiPanv, :J68 P2d 731 (1977). 
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u.~e Courts favor an interpretation in favor of cover-
age. The touchstone is that the phrase 'resident of 
the sarne household' has ·;~absolute or precise meaning, 
and, if doilit exists as to the extent or fact of cover-
age, the lai.-iguage used in l!DSt policies will be uI1der-
stood in its rrost inclusive sense. "2 
In this same regard, the California Suprane Court, in Hardware: ltttual Casua~: 
Corrpany v. Home Inderrnity Corrpany, 50 Cal. Rptr. 608, 241 C .A. 2d 303, (1966) , stated 
"'.Ihese quoted terms ('resident' and 'household') have 
no absolute rreaning 'Insofar as the cases involve 
insurance policies, they can be roughly divided into 
cases involving policies excluding from coverage of s.l-ie 
policies, rrenbers of the insured' s hous ffiold, and tr.ose 
extendi.-ig coverage to such persons. Both attempt to 
apply the rules of construction above discussed. As a 
result, in the extension cases, the auestioned terms 
are broadly interpreted, while in the exclusion cases, 
the sarre terms are given a much ITDre restricted inter-
pretation. This is necessary, because in both situa-
tions, the Courts favor an interoretation in favor of 
coverage. ' Finally, after a discussion of a nurrber of 
cases, our opinion concluded: 'These cases illustrate 
that u.~e interpretation of the tenns involved is not 
fixed, but varies according to the circumstances of the 
case. They also demonstrate that IIIJst Courts will in-
terpret the terms so as to extend the coverage if this 
can be done 1.IDder any reasonable interpretation of the 
facts.'" 
notwithstanding the fact that the case at bar is a living with inclusion case 
and the terms "resident of the named insured' s household" should receive a liberal intec· 
pretation, all of the cases cited by Appellant in its Brief in support of its contentio". 
that "intention" is relevant ai1d material and creates an issue for the jury to resolve, 2 
either living anart inclusion cases, wnere the alleged insured was not livin<ewith the 
named insured at the tirre of the accident, 1.Jut living in a separate household, or~ 
cases, ·where the Courts have applied aver-; strict interpretation to the ten;; "residento:i--... 
the named insured' s household". Li the "exclusion" cases , the Courts have held that bef: 
the insurance company can "exclude" a person from coverage as a relative resident o: 
2i3uclclin v. Hation<lde Mutual Insurance Company, 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E. 2d 633 
(1967). 
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the nared insured's household, the insurance company must prove that such a per-
son ·.vas mt "a resident of the narr.ed insured' s household" under a restricted 
i:iterpretation 1'*1.ere sxh a person would be a resident of the narred insured' s 
l1ousehold, only if such persons "intended duration was likely to be silistantial, 
where it is consistent with the infonnality of the relationship a.-id from which 
it is reasonable to conclude that t."te parties would consider the relationship 
i;1 contracting about such TIBtters as insurance or in their conduct in reliance 
~ 
thereon ' ' ' -' 
In the case at bar, an inclusion case, the Appellant, GEICO, atterrpted 
to have G.'-ie Court apply a restrictive interpretation on the term "resident of 
thenarreciinsured's househola", as set forth in Maca, Parmerin, and Granillo, supra. 
i·lnile Appella.rit did not fully succeed, Appellant was successful to the extent 
of r.-aking the "intentions" of \·lilliam Charles I:emis and his father an issue for 
the jur; by having: the Court add the following language to Instruction I'b. 14: 
"The intended duration must be determined after a 
thorough exarri.ination of all the relevant facts 
and circumstances surrounding the relationship. 
A person ' s in ten ti on at the time in ues ti on, 
be express or ir:pli or both. Errphasis adde 
This pare: of the Instruction was contrary to t.'1e Court's earlier observation that 
c.'ie only ti.Ire a person's intention niay be probative or rraterial in an inclusion 
case, is where the person is living apart from the nam2d insured in a separate 
residence at the time of the accident; ho;.;ever, where the person is living with 
i:he nameu insured at ci·1e tirr.e of the accident, as in the case at bar, then as the 
3 
.see ~:ational farrrers Lnion Property & Cas. Co. v. M3.ca, 25 Wisc. 2d 399, 132 tJ.W. 
~~ '.ili (1965), an exclusion case; Pamperin v. Milwaukee M.itual Insurance Co 
JJ \\iis. 2d 27, 197 ~M 2d 753 (1972 , an inc usion case, which followed Maca, which 
is one of the fow cases in whidt the Court expressed the view that the tenr.s "resi-
cent" and "household" are unarrbiguous and that it r:'.Ekes no difference whet.'1er the 
Policy used the tenns to include uersons as insureds or to exclude persons from cover-
age; and :ationwide M.itual Insur<filce Company v. Granillo, 573 P2d 80 (Arizona, 1977), 
3Tl exclusion case, 1..hich followed Parr:nerin and ~!aca. 
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trial Court stated, "it doesn't rrake any difference whether he intended co go 
sorr.e place at some future time or not". (Tr. 427) . 
1be Court's initial observation that "intent" is onlv a factor in cast.' 
where the person is living apart from the narred insureci in a separate residence 
at the time of the accide..1t, is supported by the case la1·1 in inclusion cases, as 
well as the author of the current Annotation at 93 AIR 3d 420, who sumnarized t:~, 
law as follows: 
"In cases involving an alleged insured who was living 
apart from the narred insured at the relevant tirrE, such 
alleged insured's intention in living separately from 
the narred insured rrav be an imPortant consideration in 
determining such person s stat:Us as a 'resident' of t.1e 
narred insured's 'household'." (Emphasis added). 
In Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10, Appellant cites the sarre Annotaticn, 
93 AIR 3d 420, but cites only a preliminary staterrent in the Annotation tl1at sets 
forfo all the factual considerations that the Courts have used in both i:cclGSio2 
and exclusion cases to determine whether or not a verson is a resident of t:.'-ie ran 
insured' s household. 93 AIR 3d 424. While all those factual consideratior.s ha1:e 
been used by the Courts, Appellant does not point out, as the author does, r.l-iat 
whether or not all or just some of those facts are relevant for consideration de-
pends on the type and nature of t:.'-ie case, such as whether it is an "inclusion" 
case or an "exclusion" case, anci whether or not the alleg"!d ins•zed is Evi.-.g 
with the narred insured or living apart from the nam2d insured in a separate house· 
hold, at the time of the accident. 93 ALR 3d 427. LI fact, i.rrr:iediateb follo.i-
ing the lai.1guage cited by Appellai1t, the author states as follo;vs. 
"A significant portion of the cases focusing upon one 
or IIDre of the policy teTIIB under consideration have 
involved a child of the narred insured. Where such 
child was sta ing w"ith the nar;-eJ insured durin:c; a ,eriod 
that :L.1cluded e date o the accident or other occur:"e.rice 
giving rise to the oontroversy conceming the child s 
status, Courts have held, on the basis of a varietv 
of circumstances, t.l-iat the child qualified as a 'resident' 
or rrerrber' of the narred i.J.1Sured s household Suen 
results have been reached desnite circ:urrstanc2s that 
included the child s separate livir:g arra.-w;E'ITE'nts duri;-iY: 
a prior period, ai.1d the child's status as ai-i indivicu.:1: 
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over the age of mjority. Section 5, infra." (Emphasis 
added) . 
'he cases cited under Section 5 are classified under the heading: "Child Living With 
. .med Insured". In every case cited where a child was living with the named insured 
at the time of the accident, including where t.'1e child had separate living arrangements 
during a prior period or 'vhether the child was over the age of rrajority, t.'1e Court 
found t.'1at the child was a resident of the n.3ID2d insured' s household. In the case 
ac oar, which also inwlves a child living with the named insured fat.'ier, where the 
child ~vas over the age of rrajority, age 23, t.1-te Court co=ectly detenrri.ned, as a mat-
cer of laJ, that the only reasonable inference to be dra;m from such facts was that 
\·lilliam Charles Jennis was a reside.1t of his father's household at the tim2 of the 
accident, February 25, 1978, and he:\C3, an additional insured under his policy of 
liability insurance . 
.. onvithstanciing the fact that the case at. bar is a living with inclusion 
case, Gr::ICD, cites four living apart inclusion cases and three exclusion cases in 
support of its position. Appellant fails to cite one living with inclusion case, 
oecause there are none that support its position, and Appellant fails to alen: the 
Court as to the type of case inwlved, or as to the facts of the case. Respondents 
subr.ti.t that it is important for the Court to kru:M the type of case and the facts 
of each case ':Jefore the Court can determine its value as a precedent. To assist the 
Court in this regard, Respond&-its have prepared the following chart, ,,ti.ich divides 
the cases cited by the parties into living with inclusion cases, living aoart inclu-
sion cases, and exclusion cases, gives the name, state, and date of the case, a brief 
statEment of the facts, states whether or not the case is one that i:wolves a child 
or relative living with the named insured or whether the child was living apart fa 
a separate household at the time in question and whether or not the Court considered 
intention as an issue and sets forc~1 the decision of the case. 
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LIVING WI'IH Arm i,IVmG APART mausron CASES 
(Liberal Internretation Of Resident) 
(Jury Question And Intent An Issue Oniy If Living Apart In A Separate House.'1old .> 
Time Of Accident) 
Jury Question 
-Case Facts And Intent Decision 
~ Dennis Sen livingwith father 'lot a jury question. µury, not a reside'.'.: I 
(Utah) for threeITOnths before Intended duration an Trial Court grantee 
1980 accident. issue, (out should not Judgrrent ; ; . 0 . V 
[have been an issue)-. - PJ'..S Im:r:rr 
Not living aoar'c L< sep-
arate house.ltold at tim= 
-
of accident. 
[l 1 
6 Buddin i~ephav living with un- Not a jury question. Jury, not a reside:-: (Scuth Carolina) cle for two rronths be- Intended duration :;OT Appellate Court h2;. 
~ 1967 fore accident. an issue. - trial Court shoulci·1 § lbt living a_Eart in sep- granted Judgrrent •• f 
d arate household at tim= RESIDEt!I i of accident, 
;::::; 
p IT 
I=' Hardwe.re Nephew living with un- ~;Qt a jury question. :lo jury. ,.,. (California) cle for one nnnth be- Intended duration :;or RESIDEIIT 
c.: 1966 fore accident. an issue. -~ -rlot living aoart in sep- ,.. 
....:i arate household at time ! 
of accident. 
3 ~ 
Jamestown 29-year-old divorced Not a jury question. [;Q jury. J 
(l~on:h Carolina) son living with father Intended duration 1:o'f RESIDE Tl f 
1966 for two weeks before an issue. -
accident. tbt living a.2art in sep-
arate household at tlire 
~: of accident. -
If Mi.one 19-year-old daughter No jury was requested. ~b jury. 
(Colorado) left home to live with Intent of daugc'"lter to teI' :\ITT A R:SIDEi:; 
Cf) l97Y. Fiancee. Father direc- rninate residency at fa- I~ li.l ~ ted insurer to take ther' s was an issue. <laugher off policy be- Living a12art in separate ~ ~ fore accident. household at tin1e of 
Cf) accident. 
~ lo Q 15 
;:::; Hardestv Father had two seoarate Jury question. Can be resident Jf; 
H (Oklahoma) households , one ~ere Intended duration ::OT separate hou:::eho:~ ~ sisters lived and raised an issue. -his son, and one where Living a12art in s epa -
~ he lived. rate household at tine 1966 . ~, , " ~ Was Father resident of of accident. Jur1 noc a res1cc .. ·, 
H sisters' household? Reve~sed. RES~· 
....:i 1967 Was son resident of :Jo jury, not a res .. ~ father's household? P-eversed, jur; Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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LIVIlfu Willi A!:ill i.IVIlfu APART IilCLuSION CASES CXXITINL'ED 
(Liberal Interpretation Of Resident) 
(Jury Ouestion And Intent An Issue Only If Living /\part In A Separate Household At 
Tirre Of Accident) 
Jury Question 
Case Facts And Intent Decision 
iteans Married mir.or son liv- Jury question. µury, PJ:.SIDTh'T of fa-
10Uahorm.) ing in anart:Eent at Intent as to which house- )ther' s household. 
~967 school, whowas suppor- [hold he was a resident of p-ury question. 
teci by fatherVJho had /was an issue. 
room at fat.'Ler' s house Living apart in separate 
anC: kept clot.'Les there household at time of ac-
cident. 
Halker 21-year-old daughter, NJ jury requested. lo jury' RESIDENI of 
(Utah) living in apartrrent Intent as to VJhich house- father's household. 
1971 who's father augmented hold she was a resident of 
incor:-e and VJho had room was an is sue . 
at father's house. Living apart in separate 
Agent told father she house.l-iold at tirr'.e of acd-
was resident and cover- dent. 
ed by father's policy. 
aa..usm: msrs 
(Strict Interpretation Of Term "Resident") 
Case Facts Intent An Issue Decision 
Gr;millo Married daughter lived L'1tended duration an issue l'b jury, 1-DT A RESIDEHI'. 
(.\rizo!kl) with parents. Going llot a resident if earlv ter- (She could sue brother). 
1977 to IIDve to an apartr.ent minaeion highly probable. 
?died on (wanted to sue brother). Pesident only if stay is long 
~erin) Been there one IIDnth be- enough that parties would 
fore accident. take relationship into con-
sideration in contracting 
for L-isurance. 
Pamoerin Single niece stayed Intended duration an issue !Jury, resident, rever-
8·Jiscmsin) wi.th uncle to care for ~:Ota resident if early ter- sed, N)T A RESIDEi.'<1'. 
1972 children from end of mination hi¢ily probable. 
~1clusion case, Sumner session to be- Resident only if stay is long 
Jtrelied on ginning of Fall ses- enough that parties would 
~·an exclu- sion. Been there 10 take relationship into con-
ton case. days before accident. sicieration in contracting 
for irsurance. 
', 
~aca 32-year-old son lived Intended duration an issue. Ir-lo jury, i·DT A RESIDIJIT. 
ll·iiscons in) with father on a fann t:ot a resident if early ter- (He could sue father). 
1%5 (wanted to sue father mina ti on highly probable. 
for farm accide:1t) . Resident only if stay is long 
Beei-i there five rronG1S enough t.11at parties would 
before accident. take relationship into con-
sideration in contracting 
for insurance. 
----
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A review of the foregoing chart clearly shows that under the facts of c· 
case at bar, an "inclusion" case, where a d1ild, William Qi.arles Dennis, was livi: 
with his narred insured fatl1er at the time of the accident and not living aDart ir 
separate household at the time of the accident, that "intention" is not relevant i 
or material, and hence, there are no issues for a jury to resolve, and that in al: 
cases, with facts similar to the case at bar, the Courts have held, as a matter o: 
law, that the child or relative was a resident of the named insured's household. 
It is also clear that Appellant, GI:ICO, has irrproperly atterrpted to have 
this O:iurt, as it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the law of "exck 
sion" cases, where a strict interpretation is applied to the term "resident of t'ie 
same household". As the author of the Annotation oointed out, "exclusion" cases I 
"are of little value as precedents in applyic-i.g clauses exter>.ding coverage to those 
to whom the tenn applies". 93 AIR 3d 427. 
In addition, it is clear that Appellant, GEICO, has illllJroperly attempte: 
to have this Court, as it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the la' ! 
of "inclusion" cases vb.ere the child or relative was "living apart" from the ruirec I 
insured in a separate household at the time of the accident, which is contrary to 
and different fran the facts in the case at bar. \'1hile in sum "living apart" cas; 
the "alleged insureds' intmtion in living separately from the narred insured r.ay ·:, 
an important consideration in determining such persons status as a 'resident' of' 
named insured's househcld" (93 AIR 3d 427) and hence, create an issue to be resol; 
by a jury, the case at bar is not a "living apart" case and thus, "intention" is,., 
relevant or material and hence, there are no issues for the jury to resolve Lncq 
the uncontroverted facts of the case at bar, as the trial O:iurt initially observeG 
"it doesn't make any difference whether the alleged insured irn:ended to go some 
else at sane future ti.me or not''. (Tr. 427) . 
The cases set forth on t11e chart are now discussed, in detail, ic< the 
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1. In Budd.in, a living with inclusion case, which is directly in point, 
a nephEW, who, being uner;iployed, nuved into the h=e of his bachelor uncle and 
lived there from August, 1965, until the accident of October 10, 1965, a period of 
about two nunths , who received nuney from his uncle to purchase food and clothing 
when he needed it and help from him to find a job, who, when err.ployed, rm.de token 
weekly contributions toward household expenses, who was not restricted to any part 
of the house, and was not looking for another place to live, was found by a jury 
oot to be a "resident of the sane household", as his relative uncle and thus, not 
entitled to liability coverage as an additional insured under his uncle's autOIID-
bile insura."lce policy. The nephEW' s ~btion For A Directed Verdict was denied, as 
was his i'btion For Judgment ~Jotwithstanding The Verdict. The Supreme O:Jurt reversed 
the jury verdict and Juc!grrent, holding as follrus: 
"The insured oolicv here included Horace E. Budd.in as 
the nam:d izlSUred and as an additional insured 'any 
re la ti ve resident of the same household' . Arrj person 
qualifying: as a resident of the S3[Jl€ household of the 
insured is an additional insured under the policy. 
The policy here is one that extends coverage and 
includes as an insured, any relative resident of 
the sarne housffiold and is not a clause excluding 
from coverage a relative resident of t.'"ie same house-
hold. 'ilie O:Jurts have unifonnly held that where 
the clause is one of bclusion, it should be broadlv 
construed for the benefit of the insured, while -
in exclusion cases the same clause is given a nnre 
restricted interpretation. Jamestown Mutual 
Insur&ice O:Jmoany v. 1;ationwide "t1.ltual Insurance 
O:Jrnpany, 266 ~'l. C. 430 , 146 S. W. 2d 410. This is 
necessary because in both situations, the O:Jurts 
favor an interpretation in favor of coverage. The 
touchstone is that the phrase 'resident of t.'1e same 
housffiold' has no absolute or precise rreaning, and, 
if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage, 
the language used in nnst policies will be understood 
in its nust inclusive sense. American Universitv 
Insurance O:Jrrpanv v. Thorrpson, 62 Wash. 2d 595, 384 
p .2d 367. fl 
"L-1. our opinion, under the cases cited, there were no 
factual issues in this case for the jury to resolve. 
The evider.ce here is susceptible of onlv one reasonable 
inference. This being tnle, the O:Jurt should have deci-Sponsored by the S J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ded the issue as a ITBtter of law and given to the inclu-
sion clause contained lll the policy here in question a 
broad and liberal construction. He should have held 
that the orily reasonable rnference to be drawn from the 
testimmv was that Alton Buddin, Jr., was a relative 
resident. of the same household as was Horace .SuddiI1, his 
uncle. It follows that Alton Buddin, Jr., was an addi-
tional icl.Sured under the policy issued by the Respondent 
to Horace Budclin. 
The Judgrrent of the lower G::lurt is reversed and this 
case remanded thereto for entry of Judgment in favcr of 
the Appellants in accordance with their f'btion For A 
Directed Verdict." (Er'q:>hasis added). 
In Buddin, the Plaintiff insurance companv argued that there were facD.;a__ 
issues for the jury's detennination, to wit: (1) the issue of payment of rent ar.c 
board while the nephe;v was in his uncle's household, (2) whether the uncle exercis, 
any degree of control over his nephEW, and (3) that there was a lack of a pemaner:/ 
living arrange.'!Ent between t.'1e persons alleged to be residents of the sar.e househ::. 
Appellant, GEICO, in the subject case, rrade this sarne arguirent with respect to "!: 
the lack of a pe=ent living arranga:nent a.Tld the subjective or declared intent«:. 
respect thereto". In the Buidin Court's opiclion, these were not proper issues for 
jury's detenni.1'.ation ic1 deciding ,..nether the nephsv was a relative resident of ths I 
same housffiold as his uncle. Although there had been testirrony concerning the fac. 
that the nephsv had "no intentions of rrDving", the G::lurt did not consider it rnte=J 
or relevant. Specifically, in response to Plaintiff insurance compai.1y 's argumenc 
relative to intent, the Court stated as follows: 
"The fact that there was a lack of a permanent living 
arrangement between the persors alleged to be residenLS 
of the same household is not determir.ative of the issue. 
Hewcomb v. Great 1'.rrerican Insurance G::l. , 260 :i. C. 402, 
133 S.E. 2d 3; Hardware Mutual Casual5tj Companv v. Home 
Indernity G::l., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303, ) Cal P.ptr. 508; 
and Jamestown Mutual LT'\surance a v. 11atioiwlide 
Mutual Insurance G::l., L'. l~.C. 30, 1 S.E. d 410. 
In the HardWare Mutual Casualty CoITlllany case, it aopears 
that a nephsv was living rvith his aunt and uncle in the 
same household on the day of the accident and had been 
for a substantial period of tirre before and after it 
'ilie Court in holding that the nephew was an additional 
insured under the policy issued to his uncle ai.<d aunt, 
said: 
'We think that a resident of the same household 
is one, other than a temporary or transient visitor, 
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who lives together wit.'1 others in the sarre house for 
a period of some duration, alchough he rray not intend 
to rermin there penr.anentl y. '" 
The Buddin Court cited and relied upon the very language which the trial 
Court used in Instruction ~b. 1'+, to instruct the jury concerning the definition 
of the word "resident", to wit: 
"A 'resident of the sarre household' within an autonn-
bile policy extendir.g coverage on a non-owned autonn-
bile to anv relative who is a resident of the sarre 
household :i.s the narred insured ITEanS one, other than 
a tanporary or transienc visitor, who lives together 
with others in the sam= house for a period of sorre 
duration, al~ough he rray not intend to rermin there 
per03I1ently. 
lhe Bud din Court ruled therefore, that, based upon the above law, which the 
trial Court also used as the law and so instructed the jury, the subjective or de-
clared intent of the relative is "not a orouer issue for the jury's dEtennination in 
deciding whether (the relative) was a resident of the sarre household as (the naIJEd 
insured)". 
2. The above lan~ge, as to the definition of the word "reside.'1t", was 
first cited in Hardware Mutual, supra, a living with inclusion case. There, the 
Court held that a nephEW, who was living with his aunt and uncle in the same house-
hold on the day of the accident, was a re1ative "resident of the same household" 
and thus, an additional insured under the policy issued to the uncle and aunt. 
Jiere, the nephEW, himself, testified that he was not living with his aunt and 
uncle at the t~ of t.'le accident and that he actually had lived in an apartment 
with his cousin fran early 1960, until June 15, 1961, a period of about a year and 
a half. His cousin, however, testified that although he shared the apartmmt 
with the nephEW beg:L.'1ning L< early 1960, he did not see much of the nephew during 
June, 1961, because the nepha" was staying with his aunt and uncle. The cousin 
also staced t.'lat the nephE'W had some clothes with him when he started staying with 
his aunt anci uncle ir, June, 1961, al though he still had some of his clothes in the 
Jparurent. Thus , the nns t t.'ie ;tephew would have lived with his aunt and uncle Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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prior to the accident, was a little less t.'1an one IDJnth (June, 1961). Hcwever, 
when arrested and whe..ri treated at the hospital , the nephsv gave, as his address , 
that of his a\IDt and \IDcle. Also, he used his a\IDt and ll:lcle 's address on his 
driver's license and car registration. Under such facts, the Court held, as a 
matter of law, that the nephew was a resident of his \IDcle 's household at the tire 
of the accident. 
3. L-1 Jarrestown Hutual, a living with inclusion case, the Court held, 
as a matter of law, that the narred insured's 29-year-old son, who had been living 
with his father for about two weeks at the tilre of his involvanent in a mtor 
vehicle collision, who was separated from his wife, had no home of his own, ate 
his meals at his father's house, slept there, had his la\IDdry done with the farriil: 
laundry, had the run of the house and ;:>aid no board, was a "resident of the sarre 
household" as his father, despite the fact that t.'1e son had previously lived in 
other places and had returned to his faber's hOUJe with ti.'-ie intention of ultirmtel 
finding a room in a boarding house. The Court pointed out that: 
"the word 'resideLJ.t' has many shades of rreariing, rang-
ing from =e temporary presence to the most penranent 
abode, and that when an insurer uses a 'slippery' word 
to designate those 1vho are L.JSured by the oolicv, it 
is not the Court's :function 'to sprinkle sand \.IDon the 
ice' by construing the term strictly." 
TI1us, in the Buddin case, where the relative had lived with t.'1e nameci 
insured for about two ront.'1s, in the P.arct1are Mutual case, where the relative had 
lived with the narred irnured for about one IDJnth, and in the Jarresta.m i"!Jtual case 1. 
mere t.'1e relative had lived with the narred insured for only two weeks, each O:iurt 
held, as a matter of law, that because the relative or child was living with the 
named insured at the time of the accident and not living apart in a separate house· 
hold, the relative or child was a resident of the named insi.rred' s household. Tue 
holding of each case was based ~on the sane definition of the word "resident" as 
was used to instruct the jury in the case at bar (excluding t:1e part mich improve:. 
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instructed the jury to determine Dennis' intended duration). In the case at bar, 
t.'1e child had lived wid1 the narred insured for about iliree rronths prior to me ac-
cident, which is longer than t.11e tin= spent in the Buddin, 1-l..ardware Mutual, or 
Jairestown ti1tual cases. 
In Words And Phrases, 1979 Cur.mulative Annual Pocket Part, the term "resi-
dent of the sarre household" is listed, whereas in the pennanent volume, me term 
"resident of d1e same household" is not listed. Thus, the 1979 Cwrnulative Annual 
Pocket Part gives all me cases cited under this term. It should be noted mat all 
three living with inclusion cases referred to above, Buddin, P.ardware M..itual, and 
James tc:wn .Mutual are cited thereunder. 
Appellant, GEICO, takes a position contrary to that of the living wim in-
clusion cases of 13uddin, Hardware M.itual, and Jamestown Mutual anci relies on four 
living apart inclusion cases and iliree exclusion cases in support of its position 
that d1e subjective or declared intent of William Charles Dennis was a factual issue 
for the jury's determination in deciding wheilier or not William Cnarles Dennis was 
or was not a resident of his famer 's household. 'Ihe four living aoart inclusion 
cases are Urri.ted Services Autorrobile Association v . .Mione, 528 P2d 420 (Colo., 1974), 
~.ardescv v. State Farm Mutual AutolllJbil2 Insurance Coypany, (CA 10 Okla.) 382 F2d 564 
(19G7) and 361 Fed. 2d 176 (1966), Aetna Casualty C.. Surety Corrpany Of Hartford, Con. 
v. li:ans, 382 F2d 26 (1%7), and American States Insurance Company, Western Pacific 
)ivision v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P2d 1042 (1971), and d1e iliree exclusion cases 
are liatiorwide Mutual Insurance O?l!lpanv v. Granillo, 573 P2d 80 (Arizona, 1977), 
Paqierin v. Milwaukee Mutual Ir.surance Ccmpany, 197 N.W. 2d 783 (Wis., 1972), anci 
;;,tional Farmers Lhlon Propertv & Casualty Ccmpany v. Maca, 132tl.W. 2d517 (1965). 
4. In Mione, a living anart inclusion case, on Uovenber 8, 1971, the 
relative, Jea.'1 .Mione, d1en 19 years of age, left her parents hor.1e following a 
family dispute to live at her fiancee' s apartment until their marriage. At the 
time, Jean gave to her father, d1e keys to the house and did not return, except 
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to pi.ck up some personal belongings. She was employed while living with her oanj 
and continued her employment thereafter. On cioverrber 17, 1971, :1er father direcc, 
his insurer, the Plaintiff, to exclude Jean from the poli.cv a.rid this was done e£:,' 
ti.ve i;overrber 19, 1971. On :;overnber 21, 1971, Jean was driving her fiancee 's aut ' 
mobile, when she was involved in an accident. Because Jean was living apart in, I 
separate household at the ti.me of the acci.de..ct, the Court stated: 
"Important factors (to detenni.ne if one rr.ay be consi-
dered the resident of a household) are the subjective 
or declared intent of the indi.vich.ial, the relacionshi.p 
between the Lcdivich.ial and the merrbers of the household, 
the existence of a second place of lodging and the rela-
tive pennanei--i.ce or transient nature of the individual's 
residence in the household." 
The Court held that "Jean intended to and did, in fact, terminate her 
residency in her parent's home prior to the accident''. The matter of intent arosi 
primarily in connection with the question of whether or not Jean had terminated 
her residency with her parents. There is no such question in the subject case. 
5. Ir:! Hardesty, a living apart inclusion case, the question was 1·iheti'ie 
or not a son was a resident of his father's household at the ti.me of the accider:c I 
The son resided at 6827 t;orth Trenton and the policy recited that the named insur0 I 
father's residence was also 6827 l·brth Trer.~>n, but the father rraintai.ned a,1d frc-
quently occupied another house nearby. The father had n..'O unmarried sisters, whc 
lived at 6827 i;orth Trenton, who raised his son from his youth. 'Ihe utilities 1-:e, 
in the narre of the father, a.rid he paid all the bills. The father was regi.sterec: 
vote from that address, received his rm.i.l there, and was listed in the telephone 
book there. He ate rreals there or at a restaurant. The Tenth Ci.rcui. t reversed 
a jury verdict that found the father was not a resident of 6827 r:orth 'Irenton at 
the tira= of the accident, because of an i..rrproper jury instruction that stated a 
person could be a rrarber of rore than one household, provided each house:cold has: 
single head and single rro.nageme.'1t. Til.e Court said the jury was left with t:he 
unmistakeable inference that there could be but one household at 6827 ::orth 'Cre.'l 
' 
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which was erroneous . '.Jie Court held the father could have had a separate house-
hold at 682 7 ~:Orth Trenton. 
On rerrand, the Court held, as a rratter of law, that the son was a resi-
dent of the household of the two sisters at G827 forth Trenton and not the fat.'1er's 
household there. Again, the Tenth Circuit reversed, this tirre stating as foll<Ms: 
'We must again reverse. In Aetna Casualty And SureRI 
Company v. l!ean,s, 382 F. 2d 26, 1967, this Court he 
that a son might be a resident of two households 
stating that the v.urds 'resident of the same household' 
as contained in an insurance policy, do not constitute 
a term of art which would dictate a oarticularized 
legal inference to be drawn from family relationships." 
The Court held that the rratter should be submitted to a jury, because the folloong 
facts were such that different permissible inferences could be drmm therefrom: 
"Ennis, Jr., was the minor son of Fnnis, Sr., and in his legal custody by virtue 
of a Divorce Decree; Ennis, Jr., resided in a house where Fnnis, Sr., ll'aintained a 
household and had been allov:ed to drive a car belonging to his father both before 
and after the accident; father and son took their rreals together; Fnnis, Sr., had, 
from time to time, contributed in part to the cost of food at 'lrenton Street; had 
?rovided his son with srrall aroounts of spenciing rroney and occasionally helped to 
provide clot.'"ling; and had exercised some parental control over his son". All those 
facts supported the proposition that the son was a resident of his father's house-
hold, which was contrary to the Court's ruling. 
Based on the holdi.ri.g in the Hardestv case, William Charles Dermis could 
:-Cave had two residences for insurance purposes, the one in Utah, where he lived 
with his father during the three rronth period prior to the accident, and the one 
with the unk:n<Mn address in Florida, where he had lived with his unkn<Mn girlfriend 
for the one rronth period prior to his return to Utah. 
0. In M:ans, a living apart inclusion case, where a minor son was living 
apart from the named insured at the relevant time, rraintaining a separate residence 
in an apartment with his wife, while attenciing school and who had mt 1i ved at his 
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father's hone since his marraige, but who was supported by his father giving hiJ:J 
1 
$150. 00 per month end who had a room in his father's home, '1bic;1 was always avail-
able to him and kept clothes in the closet of his room, the question was whet.'ler 
or not the son was a resident of his father's household at G'le time of an acci-
dent. i!otwiths tanding the fact that t.1-ie father and the son both testified that 
the son was not a resident of the father's household, the jury found that the 
son was a resident of the father's house,.'1old. The Tenth Circuit held, as it hac 
previously done iil the Hardesty case, supra, tbat: 
"an insured i.mder an autorrobile liability policy could 
legally maintain ITTJre than one hoU5ehold. So, we thin .. 1< 
a ma=ied son might be a rrerrber of his father's house-
hold a...-id at the sam= time, be the head of his own house-
hold." 
Ll accordance therewith, the Court affirrred the jury verdict a.T"\d the decision of 
the lower Court denying the 1-'btion For Judgrrent lbtwithstanding The Verdict. ille 
Court pointed out that: 
'"lhere are ma..-iy cases where a contract of insurance 
may be cons trued as a matter of law and the question 
of liability vel non decided as such by the Court. 
There are other cases where there is a conflict in 
the evidence or where different inferences are per-
missible under uncontroverted evidentiarv facts. In 
the latter kind of situations, the issue" is a fact 
issue and one which is oroperly submitted to the jury." 
Appellant insurance company, GEICO, has s true tured its argi..men t and 
Brief, as if the facts of the case at bar presented a situation similar to the 
decision in the Means case, where the Court set forth, in one column, "the evi-
dence favoring the position of w'1e Plaintiff" insurance company (that M::ans was 
not a resident of his father's household, but of a household where he lived with 
his wife) and in another colum, "the evidence favoring the position of tile 
Defendants (the injured Claimants, that Means was a resident of his father's hoi.:si· 
hold), just as Appellant insurance canpany has done in the case at bar. In the 
Means case, the Court determined that "there are factors in this case, pointing 
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as to G'l.e inferences to be drawn presented a fact issue" and thus, "it was properly 
subrnitteci co the jury". What Appellant insurance company, GEICO, fails to point 
out is that in the ~~r.s case, unlike die case at bar, the alleged insured, a minor 
son, who haci not lived with his father since his rrarriage, was living apart from 
his father in a separate household with his wife, while he was attending school, 
at the ti.Ire of the accicient. The injured Claimants atterr:pted to show that he was 
a resicient of his father's household at the tir:'e of the accident, because he was 
being supported by his father, and he had a rooll'. available to hin1 at his father's 
house and had clothes in the closet of that room. Because the case involved a child 
•.iho was living aoart from the I1a!l1Pd isisurec father, in a separate household, at the time of 
the accident, the Ccurt received testirrony of the parties' intention, which was to 
the effect that neither the father or the son considered the son to be a resident 
of the father's house..'lold. The jury cietermined that the son was a residei.1t of his 
father's householci at the time of the accident. 
The case at bar dces not involve a son living apart in a separate house-
holci, or even rraintaining a separate household at the time of the accident. ;-:ever-
theless, A,l)pellant insurance company, GEICO, lists two colunns of evidentiary facts 
as if the one colurm sets fortl1 t.'le evidence favoring Appellant's position that 
Williar:i Charles Dennis was a resident of the apartment in Florida, where William 
Q1arles Dennis lived for one IIDnth before returning to Utah, and as if the other 
oolum sets forth the evidence favoring Respondent's positio!"l that William iliarles 
Dennis was a resicient of his fat.'ler 's household, where he had lived for the !:Pree 
months prior to the accident. P.e.'1ce, Appellant, GEICO, argues it was a jury ques-
tion as to 1vhich household he was a resident of at t.'le tirne of the accident an:i 
since che jury determined he was not a resident of his father's household at the 
tim= of the accicenc, he must have bee.ri a resident of the apartment household 
in Florida. ·,his argunent is fallacious for the following reasons: First, since 
William Qiarles Dennis was not livir1g at t.'-ie aparOIEnt in Florida at the cirre of 
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the accident, but living with his fafoer, it can be decided, as a rratter of law. : 
I 
that William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's household at the tiI:., i 
of the accident. Under such facts, the parties ' iI1tention is not relevant or 
rraterial and hence, tliere is no issue for the jury to resolve As the Court 
stated in Means: 
"There are rnanv cases where a contract of insur-
ance may be construed as a rratter of la1v . . 
Second, it does not follow logically that William Charles Deniri.s could be a resi-
dent of the Florida apart:ri:Ent where he had lived for only one ITDnth before retur-
ing to Utah and not be a resident of his father's household where he had lived :c 
three rrnnths prior to d1e accident and where he was living on the day of the acc:-j 
I 
dent. Again, as the Court stated in Means: 
"An insured under an automobile liability policy 
could legally maintain rrnre than one housffiold. 
So, we think, a married son might be a IIE..rnber of 
his father's household and, at the sarre time, be 
the head of his own housEhold." 
Thus, since a person can be a resident of two se!Jarate households for insurance 
coverage purposes, eve..ri assuming arguendo that William Charles Dennis was livi'lg' 
or rnaintainL'1g the Florida apartm=nt at the time of the accident, which he was rrc I 
he could have been a resident of his father's housEhold, as well as the apartrrer.: 
in Florida. But s:li1ce he was not living at or maintaining the Florida apartrenc 
at the time of the accident, William Charles Dennis could only be a resident of 
his father's household at the tirne of the accider.t _ 
7. In Walker, a Utah living apart ir.clusion case. \mich involves 
a daughter living apart in a separate household in Utah at the ti.m= of the accicE' 
the Utah Suprem: Court apolied a very liberal definition to the words ''residenc 
of the sarrE household" in order to sustain the trial Court's rulir.g tlla.t a 21-
year-old daughter was a resident of her facher' s household in Id.&10, noL·,vithst2""-
ding the fact that at the tirne of the accident, she was living in an aparnrenc ' 
Utah, and prior thereto, had lived at a hospital in Utah for four rnndlS, all 
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training to be an x-ray technician. 1he Court noted that she had returned home 
to Idaho after ead1 college school year, that her parents augrrented her income, 
thdt she kept so!l12 furniture, books, and clothinp; in her father's home, that she 
had an Idaho driver's license, voted in the Idaho general election, anCl filed 
her income tax return in Idaho, and that she considered herself to be a resident 
of Idaho anci a resident of [1er father's household. In atterq:itir.g to apply a 
liberal definition to an inclusion case to the words "resident of a househcld" 
to jus ti:6; the lower Court's ciecision that she was a resident of her father's 
household in Idaho, even though she was living in Utah at the tine of the accident, 
the Court stated as foll=s: 
"A resicient of a household is one who is a ITEIIber of 
a family who live imder the same roof. Residence em-
phasizes ITEIIbership in a group rather than an attach-
ment to a building. It is a ll'atter of intention and 
choice rather than one of geography. 
Ordinarily, when a child is ~ay from home attending 
school, he remains a rr.errDer of the family household, 
and the question of when he ceases to be such is one 
which must be determined from all of the facts and 
circurns tanc es as revealed by the evide.rice. " 
The Court further noted that the daughter's father had asked his insur-
ance age,.-i.t whether an additional insurance policy should be taken out to cover her 
when she left Idaho for training in Uta..11 and "the agent told them she would be 
covereci by her father's policy". As was pointed out by the author of the Annota-
tion 93 AIR 3d 420, at 427, the only reason the Ca.ugher's intention was probative 
and relevant, was because the case involved a situation where the "alleged insured 
•.vas livi:.1g apart from the n.aired insured at the relevant tine". 
Based on the Walker case, it is respectfully submitted that the Utah 
Supreme Court should apply a liberal interpretation to the term "resident of 
the saIIE household" ar.d follo:.; t.'1e law. as set forth in the living with inclusion 
cases of Bucldin, Hardware i'!utual, and Jamestown ~i.itual. which are all cited in 
Words And Phrases under the definition "resident of the same household", and fur-
t:her, that the Utah Suprerre Court should rot apoly a strict interpretation to the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-30-
tenn "resident of the same household", as used in the exclusion cases. 
Appella.-it, GEICO. also argues foat the exclusion cases support i Ls posi•., 
that whether an individual is a resident rrerrber of t.'1e farrily household dererJis 
upon the transitory or pennanent nature of his stay there and specifically, 
claims that where he has intentions of nuving on, an issue of fact is creaced, 
which nust be subrritted to t.'1e jury. In support of this claim, . .1,ppellant. GEICC 
relies on the Granillo, PamperiI1, and Hi.ca cases. 
8. 'Ihe Granillo case inwlved an exclusion, rrearing that t'.1e Court 
applied a strict definitior, to the words "resident of the sarre household", rather 
than an inclusion, as the case at bar, rrea.-iirlg that the Court should apply a 
liberal definition to the words "resident of the sarre household". There, the 
Court fashioned a strict definition and concluded that a im.rried daughter. who, 
with her two children, lived with her parents fran mid or late July, 1975, \.Jr.ti: 
the accident of Au,,,aust 16, 1975, a period of about one TIDnth, was not a resident 
of her parents' household, and thus, she could sue her brother, who was drivi:ig '.o 
car at the tirre of the accident and was a resident of her parents' household. 
The married daug..'1ter had previously lived with her husband in anny-provided hous:'.J 
andinadd.ition, therrarried daughter's incent was to look for a job, find a housu 
rent it as soon as she could afford to do so. She planned to be relocated befor0 
her aney husband left for Korea in i·:Ovanber, 1975. The strict definition of t~e 
words ''resident of the sarre household", which the Court fashioned was stated as 
follows: 
'";.:ationvide stresses that no specific ti.me was stated 
for Mary Jean to leave her parents' home and that she 
could have stayed there as long as she liked. Living 
together 1mder one roof as a family. however, is neither 
t.'1e sole mr the controlling test in determi..-iing wheticer 
a oerson is a rrerrber of a household. If one ' . 
co~ 1mder the family roof for a definite short period 
or for an indefinite perioo 1mder such cirCUIIBtances 
that an early tenn.L'lation is highly probable' then one 
is not a 'rrerrber of the sarre household' . P~erin v. 
l:-1ilwaukee t1.ltual Insurance Cor.roa.=iy, 55 Wis. ~d 27, 197 
N. W. 2d 783 at 787 (1972). 
That phrase implies a ITDre endurin~ relationship than 
was here rr.anifested. If a relative lives in ~'e hoce 
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on a tanporary basis, she does not become a men:ber of 
the household '"ithin the rreaning of the exclusionary 
provision in llatiorwide' s policy. 
The intended duration of the relationshio is a fact 
to be oonsidered. Pamperin, supra. 'The intended dura-
tion should be long enough so that it is reason-
able to expect the parties to take the relationship into 
consideration in contracting about such matters as L-isur-
ance or in their conduct in reliance thereon.' :-lational 
FarnErs Union Prooer & Casual ColliDan v. Maca, 26 His. 
~d 9 , l.;L ~i.W. d 5 5 1 Emphasis added). 
lhe above strict defL'lition of t..'-ie words "resident of the sarre household" 
is cl1e very definition which Appellant, GEICO, sought to irrpose on William Olarles 
Dermis fr, the case at bar. To the extent that intent was incorporated into the 
Court's instructions to the jury re la ti ve to the words ''resident of the same house-
hold",. Appella...'lt, GEICXl, succeeded, as previously discussed, supra. The strict 
definition of the words "resident of the same household", which was used in the 
exclusion case of Granillo, was taken from the Wisconsin case of Panperin, which 
e..xtracted the strict definition from the i7isconsin case of Maca, which is also an 
exclusion case. 
9. In Parrperin, a 20-year-old single woman, after a Sumrer session at 
college, went to stay with her uncle and to take care of his children due to an 
illness L1 t.'-ie fa!!lily. She rroveci inco the house, planning to return to school 
in the Fall. About 10 days after rmving in, the woman was involved in an autorro-
bile accident driving a car owned by her =ther. The jury found the woman was a 
resident of her uncle's household, but the Wisconsin Suprane Court reversed, 
holding that, as a matter of law, the woman was not a resident of the household. 
As previously discussed and pointed out by the author of 93 AI..R 420 at 427, Pam-
eerin, infra, "is one of the fsv cases in which the Court e.'qlressed the view 
chat the terms 'resident' a...'ld 'household' are unambiguous, and that in applying 
those terms it r;akes no difference whether the policy used the terms to include 
~ersous as insureds, or to exclude persons fra;i coverage". 
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with his father on a fann, which was a requirerrent of his eq:iloyrrent there, 
for a period of five rronths prior to the accident, the Court a;iplied a strict 
L.-tterpretation to the term "resident of the sane household" and held t..'1at 
since an early tei:m:L.'18.tion of the son's living with his father v!as highly pro-
bable and because the son's intended duration was not long enough for the 
parties to take the relationship into consideration in contracting about such 
matters as insurance, the son was not a resident of his father's household, so t'; 
son was not excluded from insurance coverage, and he could sue the father for r.:-,, 
injuries he received as a result of an accident on his father's farm. 
Since the case at bar is a living with inclusion case, a liberal defiti'. 
tion should be applied to the words "resident of the sarre household" and the la.· 
as set forth in the living with inclusion cases of Buddin (relative lived with 
narred L-isured for two rronths), !laI&tJare 11utual (relative lived with narred insure: 
for one rronth), a...-id Jarrestovm Hutual (relative lived with named L-isured for c,;o 
weeks), where the Courts respectively detennined that a relative, who had lived 
with the nmred insured for a two-rronth period, a one-rronth period, and a tlvo-wee, 
period, were each TIDre than "a tEr.JpOrary or transient visitor" and each had livec I 
in the sane house "for a period of some duration", even though there was no 
"intent to remain there penranently", and thus, each Court held, as a matter of:: 
that i.rttent didn't matter, since the relative was not living apart in a seoarate 
household at the tirre of the accident and thus, each relative was a resident of 
the named insured' s household a...-id covered by the nam=d insured' s oolicy of auto-
IIDbile insurance. A fortiori, if a relative is a resident of the named insurei': 
household when he has lived there for two weeks, one m:mth, and tlvo rronths prior 
to the accident, as a matter of law. the:i. certainly a child, such as \hlliaro 
Charles Dennis, who is living with the narred insured father at the t:ilre of the ;c· 
cident and who has lived there with his naIIEd insured father for three I1Dntb.s 
prior thereto, was a resident of his father's household at the time of the 
accident and covered as an additional insured under his father's autorrobile 
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insurance policy. 
Under Utah law, William Charles Dennis was a "resident" for divorce 
purposes , the requirerrEnt being "three IIDnths next prior to cornnencerrent of the 
actior:" 30-3-1, Utah C.Ode Annotated, 1953, as amended. He was also a resident 
for purposes of the Utah Driver's License Statute, since he had sojourned in Utah 
fora period of GO days. 41-21-l(b), Utah Code Anrotated, 1953, as amended. Ee 
was also a "resident" for voting purposes. 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. Thus, if William Charles Demis is a legal resident of the State of 
Utah for divorce, driver's license, and voting purposes, and the only place he has 
lived in Utah during the three rront11s he has been in Utah prior to the accidei-it is 
at his father's household, then, a fortiori, he was a resident of his father's 
~ousehold at the time of the accident. 
COIUUSIOll 
c:OW that ti1e foregoir.g applicable case law has been fully disclosed by 
Hespondents, Holders, (1) as to the nature of the case, whether a living with 
inclusion case, a living apart inclusion case, or an exclusior: case, and (2) as 
. 'I to the facts of each case, such as whether the child or relative was living with 
the named insured at the tine of the accident, or living apart in a seoarate house-
hold at the tirre of the accident, the value and applicability of each case as a 
precedent for deciding the case at bar can now be determii.-ied. In this regard, 
Hespondenc, Holders, submit the foll=ing: 
1. Appellant, GEICO, has imJroperly atteTipted to have this Court, as 
it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the law of "e.'Cclusion" cases, 
'.vhere a strict interpretation is applied to the term "resident of the same house-
hold". As the author of the Annotation poiJ1ted out, "exclusion" cases "are of 
little value as precedents in applying clauses extending coverage to t.~ose to 
·ihom the tenn applies". 93 ALR 3d '.+27. 
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it did the trial Court, apply to the case at bar, the law of "inclusion" cases 
where the child or relative was "living apart" from the narred insured in c sep-
arate household at the time of the accident, which is contrary to and different 
from the facts in the case at bar. 'Mlile in such "living apart" cases, the 
"alleged insureds' intention in living separately from the narred insured rray be 
an important consideration in determining such persons status as a 'resident' 
of b'le named insured' s household" (93 ALR 3d 427) and hence, create an issue cc 
be resolved by a jury, the case at bar is not a "living apart" case and thus, 
"intention" is not relevant or material and hence, there are no issues for the 
jury to resolve. Under the ur.controverted facts of the case at bar, as the 
trial Court initially observed, "it doesn't make a.-iy difference whether the 
alleged insured intended to go some place else at sane future time or not". 
(Tr. 427). 
3. Since the case at bar is a living with inclusion case, where a 
child was living with his ll8IIEd insured father at the tirre of foe accident, 
the living with inclusion cases are the only cases that have value as precedents 
in determining whether or not the trial Court co=ectly held, as a matter of la1·' 
that William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's household at the til:e 
of the accident and hence, an acditional irnured under his father's policy of 
liability insurance. Under all of the cases cited "where such child was staying 
with t::he named insured during a period t.'lat includeC: t.'le date of the accident, 
. . . Courts have held, under a variety of cirCU!Il3 tances, that the child qualifi"- J 
as a 'resident' or 'merroer' of the narred insured's 'household'. Such results 1 
I 
have been reached despite circ:urrstances that included the child's separate livir; I 
a=angeirents during a prior period, and the child's status as an individual ouer 
the age of rrajority." 93 ALR 3d 425. 'There is not 011e case, with sirri.lar face' 
to the contrary. 93 ALR 3d 438-440. 
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ls 'Resident' Or 'Member' Of Same 'Eousehold' Or 'Family' As Narred Insured, Within 
Liability Insurance Provision Defining Additional Insureds", a copy of the pertin-
ent pages, including those cited by Appellant ar,d Respondents, has been attached 
as an Exhibit. 
Based on the uncontroverted dispositive facts di.at this is a living wid1 
inclusion case, where the child, William Qiarles D=nnis, was living with his named 
insured father at d1e tine of the accident and had been living with his father for 
a period of about three rronths prior to t.'l.e accident and was not living apart from 
his named insured father in a separate householcl at the tirre of the accident, Re-
spondents, Holders, respectfully submit that under such uncontroverted facts, there 
were no factual issues for the jury to resolve. William Charles Dennis' intentions 
were not l!'aterial or relevant and there was only one reasonable inference to be 
dravm fr= st:eh uncontrcverted facts and that was that William Charles Dennis was 
a resident of his father's household at the tirre of the accident at<d hence, an 
additional insured ui.der his father's policy of liabilitv insurance. 
illus, it is not difficult to see how the trial O:Jurt wasinitiallymisledby 
Appellant, GEICD, in insisting that there was case law in support of its position 
that Willian: Q1arles I::ennis' "intention" created an issue of fact, which should be 
submitted to the jury and why the trial C.ourt improperly added to what otherwise 
would have been a co=ect instruction, the language which stated that William 
Charles Dennis' "intended duration must be determined" (Instruction No. 14). 
fICNJever, once the trial Court had an ooporturii ty to study, reflect, and become 
fully advised as to the law, Appellant, GEICO's atterrpted deception was discovered. 
'.lilliarn Charles Dermis' intentions did not create an issue of fact, which should 
have been subrritted to the jury, because the case at bar was a living with inclu-
~ case, where intention is not relevant or !l'aterial, and not a living aoart 
inclusion case or an exclusion case, where intent ll'ay create an issue of fact, 
which should be submitted to the jury. In accordance therewith and ncM being 
gb advised in the prwises, the trial O:Jurt, based on the applicable law and 
! 
jl 
ii, 
w 
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the uncontroverted dispositive facts, f7ranted Jud\'I'.'ent to Respondents, LT0Dvitl1-
standing The Verdict. This was in accord with the law, as recently statc;d bv 
the Utah Suprerr.e Court Ll-iat '\vhen tJ.1e ends of justice require it, a trial Judge 
has the power and the duty to set asicie a jury's verdict and grant a 
Judgrr.ent '.btwid1standing The Verdict. 4 Since "t.1-ie Appellate Court has a corres-
ponciing responsibilicy"5 , Respondents, Holders, respectfully submit Ll-iat "the 
ends of justice require" Ll-iat U.'ce Utah Suprerr.e Court affinn the decision of t:.'te 
trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MO!\GAll, SCALLEY & DAVIS 
~Md~o-J 
Attorney for Defendants- In- liiterventior. 
and Respondents, Holders 
CTK.LIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify Ll-iat I 1119.iled two true and correct copies of t!:'.e for2-
going i3rief Of Respondent to David H. Epperson, Attorney for Plaintiff-Apoellant 
175 South West 'Ierrple, I·lo. 650, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and to Joseph C 
Fratto, Sr., Attorney for Defendant-P-espondent, llilliam lliarles Lennis, L..31 Sou:· 
300 East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, posta;ee prepaid, tbis / '3 (2· 
of February, 1981. 
4
nlpack v. Wignall, supra, at 46G. 
5Ibid, supra, at 466. 
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ANNOTATION 
WHO IS "RESIDENT" OR "MEMBER" OF SAME 
"HOUSEHOLD" OR "FAMILY" AS NAMED INSURED, WITHIN 
LIABILITY INSURANCE PROVISION DEFINING ADDITIONAL 
INSUREDS 
by 
David B. Harrison, j.D. 
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
§ I. Introduction: 
[a] Scope 
[b]-Related matters 
§ 2. Summary and comment: 
[a] Generally 
[b] Practice pointers 
II. SPOUSE Of NAMED INSURED 
§ 3. Where living with named insured 
420 
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Am jur 2d. Auwmobiie Insurance §§ 80. 98, 107; 43 Am Jur 2d, 
Insurance§§ 251-253. 315: 44 Amjur 2d. Insurance§ 1408 
3 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev). Automobile Insurance. Forms 71. 76, 
151, 151.05. 151.l, 156, 157, 157.1, 157.2: 14 Amjur Pl & Pr Forms 
(Rev), Insurance, Form 352 
3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d. Auwmobile Insurance §§ 32:6&-32:68 
13 Am Jur Proof of Facl5 2d 681, Resident of Household of Named 
Insured 
US L Ed Digest, Insurance §§ 304-306 
ALR Digests, Insurance§§ 836, 837, 845, 849, 879, 881 
L Ed Index to Annos, Dom1Cil or Residence; Insurance 
A.LR Qu1Ck Index, Add1uonal Insured; Automobile Insurance; Domicil 
or Residence; Family or Household: Insurance 
Federal Quick Index. Auwmobile Insurance: Domicil or Re.idence; 
Insurance 
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93 ALR3d LIABILITI POLICY-ADDITIONAL INSUREDS 
93 ALR3d 420 
§ 4. Where living apart from named insured: 
[a] Held "resident" or "member" 
[b] Held not "resident" or "member" 
III. CHILD OF NAMED INSURED 
A. STATUS WHERE NAMED INSURED Is ALIVE WHEN ALLEGED ADDI-
TIONAL lNSURED's CLAIM OF CovERAGE ARISES 
1-_L_Cbi ld..liYing_Jrith..DJ!JJled i.ns ureQ 
§ 6. Child living with named insured's former spouse or spouse having 
separate residence: 
[a] Held "resident" or "member" 
[b) Held not "resident" or "member" 
7. Child living apart from named insured while serving m Armed Forces 
8. Child living apart from named insured while attending educational 
institution 
9. Child living apart from named insured under other Circumstances: 
[a] Held "resident" or "member" 
[b] Held not "resident" or "member" 
B. STATUS WHERE NAMED INSURED Is DECEASED WHEN ALLEGED 
ADDITIONAL INSURED's CLAIM OF CovERAGE ARISES 
§ 10. Held not "member" of "household" 
IV. OniER RELATIVES OF NAMED INSURED 
§ 11. Held "resident" or "member" 
§ 12. Held not "resident" or "member" 
V. PERSONS NoT RELATED TO 1'AMED INSURED 
§ 13. Held· not "resident" or "member" 
INDEX 
Accidental death, liability for. § 7, 11, 12 
Agent's sratement as to insurance cover-
age of child away from home, effect of, 
§ 8 
Age of majority, status of child reachmg, 
§ 5 
Alive insured, status of child of when 
claim of coverage arises. § § 5-9 
Apartment, coverage as affected by mov-
ing, §§ 9[a], 13 
Armed Forces. effect of service with. 
§ 4[a]. 7, 11 
Automobile liability policy, § § 4 et seq. 
AWOL, nonresident son returning to 
navy base after being, § 7 
Boarder's automobile insurance- policy, 
coverage for unrelated members of 
household, § 13 
Brother, coverage of. § 12 
Child of named insured, § § 5-10 
College. status of child living away from 
home while attending, § 8 
Comment and summary, § 2 
Comprehensive personal liability policv. 
coverage under, §§ 4[aJ. 6[a] 
Contributing to expenses of home. effect 
on status, § 11 
Custody of son as affecung coverage, 
§§ 6[d]. 7, 9[a] 
Daughter-in-law living with husband's 
family. status of. § 11 
421 
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§ l[a) LIABILITY POLICY-ADDITIONAL INSUREDS 
93 ALR3d 420 
93 ALR3d 
Since relevant statutory provisions ALR2d 561. 
are discussed herein only to the ex-
tent that they are reflected in the 
reported cases falling within the 
scope of this annotation, and since 
the scope and wording of liability 
policies have frequently been the sub-
ject of legislation, the reader is ad-
vised to consult the latest enactments 
in the JUnsdiction of interest. 
[b] Related matters 
Who is "named insured" or "desig-
nated as named insured" within 
meaning of automobile insurance cov-
erage. 91 ALR3d 1280. 
Validity. construction, and applica-
tion of provision of automobile liabil-
itv policy excluding from coverage 
injury or death of member of family 
or household of insured. 46 ALR3ci 
1024. 
Automobile insurance: coverage as 
extending beyond death of named 
insured. 30 ALR3d 104i. 
Liability insurance: insurable inter-
est. 1 ALR3d 1193. 
Exclusion from "drive other cars" 
provision of automobile liability in-
surance policy of other automobile 
owned, hired. or regularly used by 
insured or member of his household. 
86 ALR2d 937. 
What is a "non-owned" automobile 
within the meaning of the coverage 
clause of an automobile liability pol-
icy. 83 ALR2d 926. 
Who is member of insured's "fam-
ily" or "household" within coverage 
of property insurance policy. 1 
the named insured or an additional in-
sured while such person ts operaung a 
vehicle which is not descnbed m the pol-
icy but which 1s owned or furnished for 
the regular use of a "resident" or "mem-
ber" of the named insured's "household." 
7. Several courts, tn cases appearing 
424 
• 
Couch, Cyclopedia 
Law, 2d Ed. 
of Insurance 
Woodroof, Fonseca, and Squillante, 
Automobile Insurance and No-Fault 
Law. 
§ 2. Summary and comment 
(a] Generally 
A review of the cases construing or 
applying the particular policy terms 
that are the subject of the present 
annotation reveals a wide variety of 
factual considerations upon which the 
courts have focused in their determi-
nations of whether a particular person 
was a "resident" or "member" of the 
same "household" or "family" as the 
jnamed insured at a particular time. 
trhose factual considerations not only 
elate to the respective individual's 
physical presence in, or absence from, 
the named insured's home during the 
period that included the date of a 
particular occurrence, but also relate 
to such matters as the relationship (if 
any) of the individual to the named 
insured, the ciri:umstances of such 
person's presence in or absence from 
the named insured's home, the indi-
vidual's living arrangements during 
earlier time periods, and the individu-
al's intention at various times with 
cegard to his place ol residence. Such 
factual considerations have become 
particularly significant ·in view of the 
express recognition by courts, in nu-
merous cases appearing throughout 
the annotation, that some or all of the 
respective policy terms are ambiguous 
or devoid of any fixed meaning.' 
throu11hout the annotation, have adopted 
a dicuonarv definition applying the term 
"household'' to a group of persons 
"dwelling" under the same roof as a 
"family." In most of those cases, however. 
the courts ha\'.e weighed a number of 
factors in determining whether a particu-
lar individual was part of the named in-
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93 ALR3d LIABILITY POLICY-ADDITIONAL INSlJREDS § 2[a] 
93 ALR3d 420 r--- ---------· ---- ----.., 
, A significant portion of the cases·· 
, focusing upon one or more of the; 
\
policy cenns under consideration have 
involved a child of the named in-
sured. Where such child was staying; 
w~th the n~in-~c!_jml!l:ed !luri_n_g: a pe-
1 
riod that inclu_<k_d _ _c_he _ _d_ate _of tbe 1 
aCCldentOr other:_ OCC\!CT~IK_e _givi_ng 
1 
lrise to the controvei:rr co_11_c_~rn_i_ng_ the : 
hild's status, courts _l]ave _ _h~l9~ o_n I, 
l:.ii:e basis of a variety_ __ of circtim- i 
~tances, that file child qualified _as_ a j 
'resident" or "member" of the ' 
fiamed insured's "ho~seh_ol{,L~-5.;cJ., j 
esults have been reached <k.s~~i!:- 1 umstances that included the child's 
~living arrangements--dilriii_g_ai 
f>rior periq_d,_ and th~_chiig'i_ ~t'!_S -~ 1 
an individual_~_ the a~ 9f majo_r:-J 
li1*' ' 
Where the child was living apar_t 
from the named insured while attend-
ing school, such child's absence has 
not prevented courts from determin-
ing, under the circumstances of sev-
eral cases, that the child remained 
during his absence a "resident" of 
the named insured's "household.' .. 
The courts in such cases have empha-
sized a variety of factors, including 
the circumstances that ( 1) the child 
continued to use the named insured's 
mailing address for various purposes, 
(2) the child left his possessions at 
the named insured's home, and (3) 
the child considered his dwelling 
place at school to be merely tempo-
rary. 
Similarly, a child's absence while 
serving in the military has been held 
under the circumstances of numerous 
sured's "family," or whether such mdiHd-
ual could be conSidered to have been 
"dwelling" with that "fam1lv." 
~infra. 
9. § 8, infra. 
cases not co interfere with his "reS1-
dence" in the named insured's "hou-
sehold," the courts in such cases fo-
cusing upon factors such as the 
child's presence under the named in-
sured's roof pnor co his entry into 
the service. and his lack of choice 
concerning the location of his military 
station. 10 
Varvir-g results have been reached 
by courts considering the situation 
where the named insured and his 
spouse were divorced or separated. 
and a child of the named insured was 
staying with the spouse (or former 
spouse) for a period including. the 
date of the occurrence giving rise to 
the litigation concerning such child's 
status. Undu the circumstances of 
some of the cases. the child was held 
co be a "resident" 0£ the -named in-
sured's "household'' despite his ab-
sence from the named insured's 
home, 11 while under the orcum-
stances of other cases. the child was 
held not to be a "resident" or "mem-
ber" of the named insured's "house- -
hold" at the relevant time. 12 
The status of a child living apart 
from the named insured under cir-
cumstances ocher than those related 
to such child's military service or edu-
cation, or the divorce (or separation) 
of his parents. has been the subject of 
several other cases within the scope 
of the present annotation. Based 
upon the circumstances of some of 
those cases. the respective child was 
held to be a "resident" of the insured 
parent's "household,"" while under 
the circumstances of ocher cases. the 
10. § 7. infra. 
11. § 6[a]. infra. 
12. § 6[b]. infra. 
13. § 9(a]. infra. 
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child was held to have failed to qual-
ify as such a "resident. " 14 
Litigation concerning the status of 
the named insured's spouse as a "res-
ident" or "member" of the same hou-
sehold as the named insured has fo-
cused primarilv upon the situation in 
which the sppuse was living apart 
from the named insured due to do-
mestic difficulties or other reasons. 
Referring to circumstances such as 
the spouse's long period of absence 
prior to the date of the particular 
occurrence giving nse to the suit, and 
the spouse's intention never to return 
to the named insured's home, some 
courts have held that the spouse's 
"residence" or "membership" in the 
named msured's household was ter-
minated prior to the particular occur-
rence." However, courts under other 
circumstances have determined that 
the spouse remained a "resident" of 
the named insured's "household" de-
spite such spouse's absence from the 
named insured's dwelling place dur-
ing the period that included the date 
of the respecuve occurrence." Factors 
such as the temporary nature of the 
particular separation have been 
deemed significant in cases of the 
latter vanetv. 
Where the named insured and his 
spouse were living under the same 
roof during a period which included 
the date of the occurrence giving rise 
to the controversv concerning the 
spouse's status, it was held, on the 
basis of the particular circumstances. 
that the spouse was at the time of 
such occurrence a "member" of the 
named insured's "household."" 
Relauves other than the named m-
sured's spouse or child have also 
14. § 9[b], infr.i. 
15. § 4[b], mfra. 
16. § 4[a], mfra. 
17. § 3, mfra 
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been the subject of cases within the 
scope of the present annotation. The 
courts under the circumstances of 
some of those cases have determined 
that the respective relative was a "res-
ident" or "member" of the named 
insured's "household."" But under 
the circumstances of other cases the 
courts have denied the particular in-
dividual's status as a "member" or 
"resident" of the named insured's 
"household" or "immediate family. " 11 
Under the circumstances of the 
small number of cases involving 
claims that a person who was not 
related by blood or marriage to the 
named insured was at a particular 
ume a "resident" of the named in-
sured's "household," the courts have 
held that the status of "resident" of 
the "household" could not extend to 
the particular nonrelative.• 
In a number of instances, the 
courts. have considered the circum-
stance that at the time a particular 
individual was allegedly living as a 
"member" of the named insured's 
"household," the named insured was 
deceased. Such cases have generally 
involved persons claiming to have 
been operating an insured automobile 
with the permission of the named 
insured's child, who was alleged to be 
an "adult member" of the named 
insured's "household," within the 
meaning of a policy provision extend-
ing liability coverage to persons oper-
ating an insured vehicle with the per-
mISsion of such an "adult member." 
Under the circumstances of each of 
the cases where the issue has arisen, 
however, the courts have denied the 
child's status as an "adult member" 
of the "household," and have ex-
18. § 11. infra. 
19. § 12. infra. 
20. § 13, infra. 
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pressed the view that the death of the Counsel for an alleged insured may 
named insured terminated the exis- also find it helpful to draw the atten-
tence of his "household."" tion of the trier of fact to any policy 
[b) Practic_e_R_C!i!'.~e~ _ 
·--counsel seeking to prove that a 
\particular individual was a "resident" 
·of the same "household" as the 
loamed insured may find it helpful to , 
/make the point, recognized by numer- ' 
'ous courts,12 that such terms are am-
' biguous and should therefore be con-
lstrued, in accordance with general 
! principles of insurance law, in such a ' 
llmanner as to favor policy coverage."' 
The point has also been made that , 
, since the terms are to be construed : 
lso as to favor coverage, the cases' which have focused upon those terms I 
; in the context of policy clauses ~, 
I duding liability coverage of an indi- 1 
i vidual found to be a "resident" of the , 
\
named insured's "household" are of: 
little value as precedents in apPIYioi: 
\clauses extending coverage to tho~e '\ 
lw wham the terms apply."' Counsel 
for an alleged insured may therefore I 
find it helpful, where such cases are 
cited as authority by opposing coun-
sel, to emphasize the tendency of I 
\
courts, in attempting to construe the I 
relevant terms in such a manner as to 
favor cove:gep to a:fPl~ those terms ' 
[i!arrowly a pose t the maniiir '1 
J.iri_ which the same terms would he 
\ pp!" ed if occurring in inclusionary i 
pohq da11Ks. ______________ ____ .1 
21. § 10, infra. 
22. See, for examr,le, Crossett v St. 
Louis Fire &: Marine ns. Co. (1972) 289 
Ala 598, 269 So 2d 869, infra § 8; Aetna 
Casualty &: Surety Co. v Miller (1967, DC 
Kan) 276 F Supp 341 (applying Kansas 
law); Mazzilli v Acci. & Casualty Ins. Co. 
(1961) 35 NJ I, 170 A2d 800, both infra 
§ 4[a]. 
23. But see Pamperin v Milwaukee Mut. 
Ins. Co. (1972) 55 Wis 2d 27, 197 NW2d 
783, infra § 12. which is one of the few 
cases in which the court expressed the 
language from which an inference 
might be drawn as to the intention of 
the insurer and the named insured 
with respect IO the application of the 
poLicy clauses referring to such 
phrases as "resident of the named 
insured's household." In this connec-
tion, at least one court has seized 
upon the term "'family," appearing in 
the policy title ("Family Automobile 
Policy"). and has inferred from that 
word an intention to protect all mem-
bers of a particular family as long as a 
family relationship legally existed 
(and even though the person claiming 
coverage was separated from her in-
sured husband and had filed for d1-
vorce).'" 
1 In cases involving an alleged in-
ured who was living apart from the 
amed insured at the relevant time, 
uch alleged insured's intention in 
ivin se aratel from the named in-
ured ma be an im ortant considera-
tion in determining such person's sta-
tus as a "resident" of th amed 
·nsured's "household." here the al-
leged insured had at the time of sepa-
ration formed an intention never to 
return, counsel for the party seeking 
to exclude such individual from cov-
view that the tenns "resident" and "hou-
sehold" are unambiguous, and that in 
applying those terms it makes no differ-
ence whether the policy used the terms to 
include persons as insureds or to exclude 
persons from coverage. 
24. See, for example, Crossett v St. 
Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. ( 1972) 289 
Ala 598, 269 So 2d 869. infra § S. 
25. Aetna Casualty & Suretv Co. v 
Miller ( 1967, DC Kan) 276 F Supp 341. 
infra § 4(a]. 
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erage may find it beneficial to bring 
that circumstance to 1he attention of 
the tner of fact.,. The alleged in-
sured' s intention that his or her ab-
sence from the named insured's 
dwelling place was to be merely tem-
porary, or such person's lack of an 
intention to permanently live apart 
from the named insured, is a factor 
which counsel for the alleged insured 
would ordinanly be well advised to 
bring out. 77 
Although the cases considering an 
individual's status as a "resident" of a 
particular "household" generally fo-
cus upon the individual's status at the 
time of the occurrence from which 
the conflicting claims of coverage 
arose, the courts have in some in-
stances considered circumstances ex-
isting after the respective incidents as 
having a bearing upon the question 
of the particular individual's status at 
the time of the incident. Where the 
named insured and his or her spouse 
were, because of marital problems, 
living separately prior to the spouse's 
involvement in an accident with re-
spect to which liabilitv coverage is 
claimed, counsel for such alleged in-
sured might find it helpful, where 
warranted by the evidence,• to at-
tempt to bring out the parties· subse-
quent reconciliation as bearing upon 
the spouse's. intention at the time of 
the particular incident. 
26. See. for example. Firemen's Ins. 
Co. v Burch ( 1968, Tex Civ App) 426 
SW2d 306, affd in pan and vacated in 
pan on other grounds (Tex) 442 SW2d 
331. infra § 4(b]. in which the court's 
decision. denying liabilily coverage to the 
named msured's wife was based in pan 
upon the observation that from the time 
she had become separated from her hus-
band, she never intended to resume living 
With ham. 
27. As an example of a case in which 
such factors were deemed to be signifi-
428 
II. Spouse of named insured 
§ 3. Where living with named in-
sured 
Under the following circumstances 
it was held that the named insured's 
spouse, who was living under the 
same roof as the named insured on 
the dav of an occurrence giving rise 
to the spouse's claim of coverage 
under the named insured's liability 
policy, was at the time of the occur-
rence a "member" of the named in-
sured's "household." 
Construing a garage liability policy 
clause providing coverage with re-
spect to certain of the named in-
surec:\'s automobiles when used for 
nonbusiness purposes by a "member 
of the household" of the named in-
sured, the court in Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co. v Johnson (1961, ND) 
1 IO NW2d 224, held that the named 
insured's wife, who was living with 
her husband at the time of her in-
volvement in an accident while driv-
ing an automobile owned by him, 
qualified at the time of the accident 
as a "member" of her husband's 
"household." That there could be no 
doubt as to the wife's status was, in 
the court's view, a conclusion that 
was warranted by (I) judicial author-
ity supporting the proposition that 
the terrn "household" applied to per-
sons dwelling together as a family, 
and (2) a dictionary definition apply-
ing the terrn to a family, a domestic 
cant, see Hawaiian Ins. &: Guaranty Co. v 
Federated American Ins. Co. (1975) 13 
Wash App 7, 534 P2d 48, 93 ALR3d 
407, infra § 4(a]. 
%8. As an example of a decision in 
which a subsequent reconciliation was 
taken into consideration in determining 
whether a separation was intended to be 
temporary or pennanen(, see Hawaiian 
Ins. & Guaranty Co. v Federated Ameri-
can Ins. Co. 11975) 13 Wash App 7, 534 
P2d 48. 93 ALR3d 407, infra § 4(a]. 
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III. Child of named insured SE2d 830. held that a finding that the 
A. Status where named insured is 
alive when alleged additional 
insured's claim of coverage arises 
~ 5. Child living_~ilh nam~ insured Thescatus of the named insured's hild as a "resident" or "member" of he named insured's "household" has een an issue both m cases constru-
0ing policy provisions extending liabil-
ity coverage to a "resident" of the 
named insured's "household," and 
cases dealing with policy language 1 
extending liability coverage to one 
operating an insured automobile with 
, the permission of an "adult member" 
I of the named insured's "household." 
'Des~ evidence_gf such matters . as 
the separace--living arrange-ments that '1 
the partic\ilar ~hild haCI on previous I 
occasions, or the child'~ auainmerH_ 9f 
theage o'f 111ajori!}', th_e _c0ur\~ und~ 
the circumstance5_()f _\he __ follgwi_ng 
cases held either that (11-Lcl:iil<lJiy-
ing under theSarn~~_goJ -~_his__in­
sµred parent on th,e .ili!1e~ of _the 
accident or other occurrence giving 
rise to the suit was at thetime-oEum 
o~ a "resfdent'~r-''memoe'r" 
of the named insured's''llousehold:" 
O~there_ w<!S.::-~uffiZi_ent evi-
dence to 2!1.P.J'.>Orl the_ co11@sion tfiat 
a child living under th!' named_ i_n-
sured's roof on the relevant date 
s11_ch a "res.iikni,'• - _:____ = -~ ___ ___) 
Focusmg upon that portion of an 
automobile liability policy's non-
owned automobile clause extending 
coverage to a "resident" of the same 
"household" as the named insured, 
the court in Travelers Ins. Co. v 
Mixon (1968) 118 Ga App 31, 162 
r nro;.-p-.;-r-po,es oflhe present sectio-n:~ -
~ven if the child wa5 on his way to an-
pther dwelling at the time of the particu-
lar occurrence, such child is deemed to 
p~~_living under the named in-
438 
son of the named insured was not a 
"resident" of his father's "house-
hold" at the time of the son· s involve-
ment in a mo10r vehicle collision was 
not required as a matter of law where 
there was evidence ind1caung. mter 
alia, that although the son had, dur-
ing the 6-month period prior to the 
accident. lived and worked 111 a sepa-
rate cit; from that of his father. he 
had returned to h1S father's house on 
most weekends during that period 
and was returning from what had 
apparently been a weekend at his 
father's house when the accident oc-
curred. The court referred to vanous 
other matters, including, mter aha, 
evidence that (I) for 3 or '1 months 
following his gTaduation from high 
school the son had continued to live 
in his father's home, until he found 
work in the other citv, (2) when he 
returned to his fath~r· s house on 
weekends. his mother did h1S laundry 
and prepared food for him to. take 
back, and (3) he had a room in his 
father's house where he left some of 
his clothes. The court added that the 
judicial authorities did not md1cate 
that residing at another place for a 
part of the time prevented a relative 
from being a resident of the house-
hold under an extension of coverage 
provision. Moreover, the court noted 
that the insurer could have employed 
terminology such as "reSJdent exclu-
sively" or "resident for a greater part 
of the time" if it had w1Shed to so 
limit the coverage. 
· Applying automobile liability policv 
language providing coverage for 
those driving the insured automobile 
with the permission of the named 
S:Ured'S roof ,-,-on the date of" the octur-
rence 1f the child was sta~ing wllh th~ 
named insured for a period that included 
both the day prior to the occurrence rnd 
a f'"-" of the day of the occurrence. 
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insured or an "adult member" of his deemed part of a "household." The 
"household,.. the court in Ocean court also stated that "residence" 
Acc1. & Guaranty Co. v Schmidt does not involve the elements of per-
( 1931, CA6 Ky) 46 F2d 269, held, in manancy, continuity, and kinship with 
a decision apparently applying Ken- physical, social, cultural, and political 
tucky law, that the named insured's attributes that are inherent in a 
24-year-old son, who at all relevant "home" (in the sense of a domicile), 
times lived, ate his meals. slept. and and that while a person could have 
had his washing cone in the home of only one true domicile, he could have 
his father, was an "adult member" of more than one residence. The court 
his father's "household," even though rejected the argument, that the con-
he was not dependent upon his father trolling factor in determining the 
for support. The court noted that the household of which the boy was a 
term "household" had such dictio- resident was a decree awarding cus-
narv definitions as ( 1) a domestic tody to the mother and mere visita-
est~blishment, (2) the members of a tion rights to the father: The court 
house collectively, and (3) those who stated that one of the purposes of the 
dwf!l under the same roof and com- extended coverage provision of the 
pose a family. The court concluded policies was to assist the named in-
that in view of those definitions, it sured in complying with his moral 
had no doubt as to the status of a son and legal obligauon to maintain and 
who has reached majority and sup- support his family, and that the prac-· 
ports himself. but who lives under his tice under which the boy stayed with 
parents' roof. his mother during the week and his 
Construing liability policy language father on each weekend indicated that 
defining the term "insured" to in- a substantially integrated family rela-
clud~ relatives of the named insured tionship existed between the boy and 
if "residents of his household," the his mother on the one hand and the 
court in Miller v United States Fidel- boy and his father on the other. In 
ity & Guaranty Co. (1974) 127 NJ the court's opinion, the boy's inten-
Super 37, 316 A2d 51. held that a tion to be a part of each household 
divorced couple's 9-year old son, who was clearly manifested by the fact that 
set fire to the plaintiffs' barn after when he was asked who he lived with, 
having been brought to his father's he replied "My dad and my mom." 
home for a weekend visit. was at the Construing automobile liability pol-
time of the incident not onlv a "resi- icy language which extended coverage 
dent" of the "household" ~f his fa- (with respect to the operation of non-
ther, with whom he stayed on week- owned automobiles) to any relative of 
ends, but was also a "resident" of the the named insured qualifying as a 
"household" of his mother. with "resident of the same household" as 
whom he lived during the week. In an the named insured, the court in 
opinion pertaining to coverage under Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v Nation-
policies issued bv both the father's wide Mut. Ins. Co. (1966) 266 NC 
and the mother's insurers, the court 430, 146 SE2d 410, held that the 
>lated that the term "household" is named insured's 29-year-old son. who 
not confined within universally ac- had been living with his father ]Qr 
cepted limits, and that members of a about 2 weeks at the time of his 
family need not in all cases reside irr;olvement in. a motor vehicle col!i-
under a common roof in order to be sion, was a "resident of the same 
439 
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household" as his father despite the 
fact that the son had previously lived 
in other places and had returned to 
his father's home with the intention 
of ultimately finding a room in a 
boarding house. The court pointed 
out, inter alia, that the word "resi-
dent" has many shades of meaning, 
ranging from mere temporary pres-
ence to the most permanent abode, 
and that when an insurer uses a "slip-
pery" word to designate those who 
are insured by the policy, it is not the 
court's function "to sprinkle sand 
upon the ice" by construing the term 
strictly. That the son was "a resident 
of the same household" as his father 
was, in the court's view, clearly shown 
by the circumstances 1ha1 ( 1) the son, 
who had become separated from his 
wife, had no home of his own, (2) 
when he came back to his father's 
house, he carried with him all his 
possessions, (3) the son had intended 
to remain at his father's house until 
quarters more convenient to his em-
ployment could be found, (4) he ate 
at his father's house, slept there, had 
his laundry done with the family laun-
dry, and had the run of the house, 
and (5) he paid no board. 
Despite 1he circumstance that the 
named insured's son had quit high 
school and left his father's community 
prior to the son's involvement in an 
automobile accident, the court in 
Travelers lndem. Co. v Mattox (1961, 
Tex Civ App) 345 SW2d 290, writ ref 
n re, held that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding 
that the son, who was staying with his 
parents at the lime of the accident, 
was at that time a "resident of the 
same household" as the named in-
sured (his father), within the meaning 
of an automobile liability policy 
clause extending coverage to 1hose of 
the named insured's relatives who 
qualified as such "residents.". The 
440 
court pointed out that the domicile of 
a minor child is as a mailer of law 
that of his father, and thal since "resi-
dence" is a lesser included element 
within the technical definition of the 
broader term "domicile," it followed 
that if the young man had his domi-
cile in the house of his father, he had 
a residence there also, even though 
he may have had other residences at 
the same time. The court further 
stated that if he had a residence at his 
father's house, then he was a "resi-
dent of the same household," within 
the meaning of the policy. Moreover. 
the court pointed out that whether or 
not the son's residence was in "the 
same household" as his father was a 
factual matter, and the court referred, 
as supporting its conclusion, to the 
circumstances that (I) when the son 
left his father's community to go to 
work for a brother in another town, 
he carried only his work clothes, leav-
ing all of his . other personal belong-
ings at his father's house, and (2) 
before the son quit school and left, 
his father had talked to him about 
finishing school, and it was his fa-
ther's opinion that the boy would 
return to school the following year if 
a change of teachers were made. 
But see Indemnity Ins. Co. v San-
ders, ( 1934) 169 Okla 378, 36 P2d 
271, infra § 12, in which the court, 
although focusing upon the question 
whether the named insured's son-in-
law was a member of his facher-in-
law's household, stated in dictum that 
the named insured's daughter, who 
was spending a few days with her 
parents because of marital problems, 
was not a "member" of the "house-
hold" of her father. 
To the same effect (and arising 
from the same accident) as Indemnity 
Ins. Co. v Sanders (1934) 169 Okla 
378, 36 P2d 271. supra. is Indemnitv 
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